Did we settle this case or not? Don't risk letting the court decide.

• Author: Rippee, Stephanie M.
• Position: Mississippi

This article originally appeared in the December 2010 Product Liability Committee Newsletter.

A recent Mississippi Supreme Court decision gives trial judges the authority to intercede, in the absence of a written settlement agreement, as a finder of fact to answer disputed questions as to whether the parties settled their cases and on what terms. The decision on this issue came in a recent product liability case, but it has implications for almost any matter litigated under Mississippi law.

In Illinois Central Rail Road v. Byrd, (1) a large group of former employees sued the railroad alleging occupational exposure to asbestos. After litigating for a couple of years, counsel for both sides had a meeting in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to discuss settlement. Plaintiffs alleged that at the meeting the parties agreed to settle all the claims of all plaintiffs. (2) Illinois Central Railroad Company ("ICRR") alleged that the parties entered into a conditional settlement process whereby each plaintiff's claim would be settled if the plaintiff met the following criteria: 1) plaintiff had not signed a prior occupational release; 2) plaintiff's claim was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and 3) plaintiff completed and signed a pulmonary questionnaire, provided proof of employment, and submitted to a chest x-ray from a credible "B-reader." (3) Importantly, whatever agreement truly was reached was not reduced to writing.

After the meeting, ICRR did, in fact, execute settlements with most of the plaintiffs. ICRR declined to settle with a small number of the plaintiffs, however, claiming that the conditions for settlement had not been met. (4) ICRR claimed that these plaintiffs failed to meet the settlement conditions primarily because they had signed a prior occupational release and/or their chest x-rays had been read by Dr. Harron, a physician whose credibility as "B-reader" had been challenged in legal proceedings. (5) Approximately twenty-five of the plaintiffs with whom ICRR refused to settle moved to enforce the settlement. In response, ICRR moved to sever and dismiss the claims of these plaintiffs challenging both joinder and venue. (6)

The trial court held a hearing on the motions. At the hearing, the parties presented only affidavits (not live testimony) from the attorneys for both sides who had been present at the Pittsburgh meeting. (7) The trial court denied ICRR's motion to sever and dismiss as moot and ruled that: 1) no agreement existed to disqualify a plaintiff who had executed a release from the settlement process; 2) no agreement existed to disqualify a plaintiff based on statute of limitations; 3) an agreement existed to settle the claims of the plaintiffs after submission of a release...