Setting a better standard: evaluating jail officials' constitutional duties in preventing the sexual assault of pretrial detainees.

• Author: Bopp, Blair A.

Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2014).

1. INTRODUCTION

   According to a recent survey of American federal and state inmates, 4.5 percent of the nation's prisoners--roughly 60,500 people--reported experiencing sexual violence while in prison. (1) The Supreme Court has stressed that "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" (2) Congress responded to this ongoing problem by enacting the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") in 2003. (3) PREA established a zero-tolerance standard for prison sexual assault and mandated the United States Department of Justice to make the prevention of such assault a top priority in American prisons. (4)

   Jail and prison officials have a duty to protect inmates under their supervision from being subject to violence at the hands of fellow inmates. (5) When employees of a jail do not adhere to the jailhouse policy of locking the cell doors each night and an inmate is sexually assaulted by another inmate as a result, a question arises as to who is culpable for the breach of safety. (6) However, just because a jailhouse policy has been violated does not mean the inmate has suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. (7) It is when the policy equates to a constitutional minimum, given the totality of the circumstances, that the court properly considers the breach of policy to amount to a constitutional deprivation. (8)

   This Note examines Walton v. Dawson, a recent Eighth Circuit decision that considers whether jail officials should be held accountable when an inmate-on-inmate sexual assault occurs and the assault was directly facilitated by the failure of the officials' subordinates to follow the jailhouse policy of locking cell doors overnight. (9) Parts II and III introduce the facts and holding of Walton and the legal context within which an analysis of the instant case may be framed. Part IV synthesizes the court's rationale in the Walton decision with the established legal context. Finally, Part V discusses Walton's foreseeable impact on future deliberate indifference claims. This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit should adopt an objective standard when reviewing claims of deliberate indifference brought by pretrial detainees against jail officials.

2. FACTS AND HOLDING

   The defendants in this case were Macon County Jail administrator David Moore and Macon County Sheriff Robert Dawson (hereinafter, collectively "Officials"). (10) These Officials were not the individuals actually responsible for locking the cell doors at the Macon County Jail on a nightly basis. (11) In fact, they were not even present at the jail on the night the plaintiff ("Walton") was sexually assaulted by his cellblock neighbor, Nathaniel Flennory ("Flennory"). (12) On interlocutory appeal, the Officials argued that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Northern Division, erred in denying both of them qualified immunity against Walton's failure to train claims. (13) Walton brought his claims against the Officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which states in the pertinent part:

   Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.... (14) Walton argued that the Officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to train jailer Ryszard Bilinski ("Bilinski") to properly lock the cell doors at night, thereby failing to provide Walton with physical protection from Flennory. (15) Walton asserted a Fourteenth Amendment violation rather than an Eighth Amendment violation (16) because the Eighth Amendment applies only to post-conviction prisoners, whereas Walton was a pretrial detainee at the time of the assault. (17)

   Walton's detainment in the Macon County Jail stemmed from events that occurred in February 2010. (18) He arrived at the jail on August 25, 2010, and was assigned to a cell in the same cellblock as Flennory. (19) Flennory was a convicted rapist with a known history of sexual misconduct toward fellow inmates (20) and was in the Macon County Jail at the time of the assault awaiting transfer to the Missouri Department of Corrections to serve out a fifteen-year sentence. (21) Each cellblock at the Macon County Jail contained three individual cells. (22) The cellblocks were self-contained, but each cell also had its own locking door. (23) At the time when Flennory and Walton were held in the same block, they were housed in adjoining cells and had no other cellmates. (24)

   On May 31, 2010, three months before the assault took place, Flennory was disciplined for entering the unlocked cell of another inmate in the night and "nibbl[ing] his penis over his clothes." (25) Flennory was confined to segregation because of this incident until June 4, 2010, when he attempted suicide. (26) For the following eighteen days Flennory remained in a psychiatric center. (27) He was transferred back to the Macon County Jail on June 22, 2010, and returned to the segregation unit at that time. (28) However, due to a renewed display of suicidal tendencies, Sheriff Dawson returned Flennory to the general prison population several weeks later. (29) On August 29, 2010, the day before the assault, Flennory passed Walton a sexually explicit note. (30) Walton took the note as a joke (31) and did not bring it to the attention of any of the jail's personnel. (32) He simply flushed the note down his toilet. (33)

   The next morning, shortly before 4:00 a.m., and only five days after Walton had first arrived at the jail, Flennory entered Walton's cell and fondled him against his will. (34) Flennory then induced Walton to go next door to Flennory's cell, and Walton reluctantly complied. (35) It was at this time that Bilinski arrived at their cellblock for a walk-through. (36) When he reached Flennory's cell, Walton did not say anything to Bilinski about the imminent assault. (37) It was after Bilinski continued walking that Walton alleged Flennory sexually assaulted him. (38) Bilinski performed one more walkthrough that morning, after the assault was over, and Walton maintained his silence towards the jailer once again. (39) A short time later, another officer arrived at Walton's cell with his breakfast. (40) Walton gave this officer a note stating he had been raped. (41)

   In his complaint, Walton argued that prisoners have a reasonable expectation of physical safety and protection from other inmates while incarcerated. (42) He claimed that locking cell doors at night, when constant supervision is not available, is a simple and effective way of preventing inmates' access to one another. (43) The complaint went on to say that when an overnight jailer fails to take such a step and states that the policy of locking the cells at night was never enforced prior to the instant assault, the management of the facility is called into question. (44) Enduring sexual assault at the hands of another inmate has been equated to a form of "cruel and unusual punishment," which is expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. (45) However, this interpretation has only been applied to persons already convicted of a crime. (46) Because Walton was a pretrial detainee at the time of the assault, the Fourteenth Amendment was invoked instead. (47) This amendment affords state pretrial detainees "rights which are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." (48) Walton maintained that the Officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights through a showing of deliberate indifference to those rights. (49) He contended that because the Officials were previously aware that the cell-locking protocol was not regularly followed, they were aware of the risk posed by their inadequate training or supervision. (50)

   The Officials responded to the allegations that they violated Walton's constitutional rights by claiming they were entitled to qualified immunity in the matter. (51) "[A] defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." (52) The Officials maintained that they were entitled to summary judgment on the matter of qualified immunity because they were unaware that Bilinski was not locking the cell doors at night. (53)

   The district court denied the Officials' motion for summary judgment in pertinent part. (54) The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard the instant case on interlocutory appeal, with each official requesting to have his denial of qualified immunity reevaluated. (55) The nature of this interlocutory appeal granted the reviewing court limited jurisdiction only to determine whether there was a genuine violation of federal law and required the Eighth Circuit to accept as true the district court's findings of fact. (56) The Eighth Circuit held that in the pretrial detainee's action for violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Officials' motion for summary judgment was properly denied. (57) The court concluded that the Officials were not entitled to qualified immunity when they knew that the jail cell doors were not being locked at night and that an obvious and substantial risk to inmate safety existed as a result. (58)

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND

   The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. (59) This amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process clause. (60) Generally, the Constitution prohibits only...