Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad

• Author: Jules Lobel
• Position: Bessie McKee Wathour Endowed Chair, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
• Pages: 1629-1675

1629

Separation of Powers, Individual Rights,

and the Constitution Abroad

Jules Lobel

I.INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1631

II.THE HISTORY OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL STRUCTURAL/

INDIVIDUAL-RIGHTS DIVIDE ................................................................. 1635

A.SEPARATION OF POWERS AND STRUCTURAL RESTRAINTS ON

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS ABROAD ..................................................... 1635

1.Hamdan v. Rumsfeld .............................................................. 1636

2.Johnson v. Eisentrager ............................................................. 1638

3.Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton ... 1638

4.Iran–Contra Majority Report ............................................... 1640

5.Applicability of Other Separation-of-Powers Provisions .... 1641

B.THE COURT’S INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,EXTRATERRITORIAL

JURISPRUDENCE .............................................................................. 1644

C.BOUMEDIENE AND THE INDIVIDUAL-RIGHTS/SEPARATION-OF-

POWERS TENSION ........................................................................... 1647

III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL-RIGHTS/

SEPARATION-OF-POWERS DISTINCTION ................................................ 1651

A.THE JURISDICTIONAL ANSWER ........................................................ 1652

B.TEXTUAL DIFFERENCES AND FRAMERS’INTENT ................................ 1658

C.THE LESSER INTRUSIVENESS OF RELIEF BASED ON SEPARATION-OF-

POWERS RESTRAINTS ...................................................................... 1660

Bessie McKee Wathour Endowed Chair, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I want

to thank David Cole, Gerald Neuman, Jonathan Hafetz, and David Harris for their helpful

comments on this Essay, and my Research Assistant Bret Grote for his research help. I also

thank the University of Pittsburgh Document Technology Center for their excellent help in

preparing this Essay.

1630 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1629

IV.SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE RULE OF LAW:RECASTING THE

COURT’S EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON

FUNDAMENTAL VALUES ........................................................................ 1662

A.SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE RULE OF LAW .............................. 1664

B.BOUMEDIENE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ............................... 1666

C.FUTURE IMPLICATIONS ................................................................... 1669

V.CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1675

2013]THE CONSTITUTION ABROAD 1631

I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution’s application to U.S. governmental action against

aliens abroad has differed with respect to “structural limitations” on

governmental power and those provisions that set forth “individual rights.”1

The courts have generally treated structural constitutional limitations, such

as separation-of-powers restraints, as applicable whenever and wherever the

U.S. government acts.2 In contrast, only some of the constitutional

provisions which grant individual rights restrain government actions against

aliens abroad.3 Since the beginnings of the republic, the Court and the

political branches have generally viewed the Constitution’s separation-of-

powers restraints as applicable wherever and against whomever the United

States government acts. However, there has been an ongoing debate in the

courts and across the country for more than a century over which, if any,

individual constitutional rights can be applied to restrain governmental

actions against non-citizens outside the United States.

While this separation-of-powers/individual-rights dichotomy has a long

pedigree,4 few, if any scholars have explored its underlying rationale or

analyzed whether the distinction withstands scrutiny.5 Neither scholars nor

courts have asked why separation-of-powers principles are applied anywhere

1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 995–98 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J.,

dissenting), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Brief of Amici Curiae Certain Former Federal Judges in

Support of Petitioner (Separation of Powers: Enforceable at Guantanamo), Hamdan v.

Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53990 [hereinafter Brief of Former

Federal Judges]; KAL RAUSTIALA,DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?THE EVOLUTION

OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICA N LAW 244–45 (2009) (“Structural provisions, such as bans on

title of nobility, are arguably different [from individual-rights provisions]. Because they

determine the scope of federal power, they apply everywhere the federal government acts.”);

Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government Theory of Extraterritorial Detention,

62 N.Y.U.ANN.SURV.AM.L. 637, 641–42 (2007) (supporting Judge Rogers’ position of a “non-

rights based, limited-government theory”); Jean-Marc Piret, Boumediene v. Bush and the

Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Constitution: A Step Towards Judicial Cosmopolitanism?, UTRECHT L.

REV., Dec. 2008, at 81, 98 (“[T]he Suspension Clause is as much a limitation on Congressional

power as it is a source of individual rights.”); Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, The Ties That Bind:

The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO.L.J. 237 (2007).

2. SeeHamdan, 548 U.S. 557, superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.

L. No. 109-3666, 120 Stat. 2600; Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).

3. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) (rejecting

application of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause to a search conducted in Mexico);

Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 144–45 (1904) (deciding that the Sixth Amendment’s

right to a jury trial was inapplicable to certain overseas territories).

4. Professor Raustiala observes that the “geographic implications of this distinction

between structural and individual rights provisions, noticed as early as the antebellum debates

of Calhoun and Webster, undergirded the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Insular Cases, an d

can be tracked through many later judicial decisions.” RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 244.

5. See Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 1, and Hayden, supra note 1, for two examples that

discuss the distinction and argue that a structural or limited government approach should be

applied to United States governmental actions abroad, but do not explore and scrutinize in

depth the rationales for the distinction and whether those rationales mak e sense.