Sentencing Considerations

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

IV. Sentencing considerations

A. Broad discretion of the sentencing judge

The primary objectives of sentencing are punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 682 (1995). The sentencing judge has broad discretion in deciding what factors to consider in sentencing. See Anthony v. State, 117 Md. App. 119, 130 (1997). In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that sentences imposed within the statutory limits are generally not subject to review. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Supreme Court stated:

The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of the particular offender. This whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions—even for offenses today deemed trivial. Today's philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example between first and repeated offenders. Indeterminate sentences, the ultimate termination of which are sometimes decided by non-judicial agencies have to a large extent taken the place of old rigidly fixed punishments.

Id. at 247-48.

In Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937), the Supreme Court stated: "For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular act by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character . . . of the [defendant]." Id. at 54. See also Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516 (1996); Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364 (1984); Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480 (1981) (explaining that a sentencing judge is vested with virtually boundless discretion).

In Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175 (1972), the Court of Appeals stated that the sentencing judge is encouraged "to consider information concerning [the defendant's] reputation, past offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, social background, and any other matters that a judge ought to have before him in determining the sentence that should be imposed. . . ." Id. at 193; see also Graves v. State, 133 Md. App. 97, 105 (2000), rev'd on other grounds, 364 Md. 329 (2001). The fact that a sentencing judge consistently imposes harsh sentences does not mean that the judge fails to exercise his or her discretion. Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532, 548-49 (1997).

The defendant's right to a fair trial includes an impartial and disinterested judge. Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 206 (2001). Maryland Rule 4-342(f) provides that sentencing judges should ordinarily state on the record the reasons for imposing a sentence. However, in Maryland judges are not required to give their reasons for all cases. see Brashear v. State, 90 Md. App. 709, 724 (1992); accord State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 682 (1992) (explaining that a judge is not required to give reasons for a sentence imposed at a probation revocation hearing); see McElroy v. State, 90 Md. App. 48 (1992).

1. Supreme Court

Williams v. New York, is considered a seminal case regarding a trial judge's discretion to consider a wide variety of factors during sentencing. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). In Williams, the defendant challenged the judge's consideration, for sentencing purposes, of evidence, primarily the defendant's probation report, that was not introduced at trial. The Court recognized that the facts of the case presented "a serious and difficult question" relating to "the rules of evidence applicable to the manner in which a judge may obtain information to guide him in the imposition of a sentence on an already convicted Defendant." Id. at 244.

The defendant was convicted of murder, and the jury recommended a life sentence. Id. at 242. The sentencing judge imposed the death penalty. Id. The Supreme Court upheld his sentence and explained that the trial judge may consider evidence during sentencing that was not admissible during the guilt-innocence phase. The Court stated:

Modern changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary now than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing process. [I]ndeterminate sentences and probation have resulted in an increase in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishments. [A] strong motivating force for the changes has been the belief that, by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders, many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship. This belief to a large extent has been justified.
Under the practice of individualized punishments, investigation techniques have been given an important role. Probation workers making reports of their investigations have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders. Their reports have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guesswork and inadequate information. To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information would undermine modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation. We must recognize that most of the information relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination. And the modern probation report draws on information concerning every aspect of a Defendant's life. The type and extent of this information make totally impracticable if not impossible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial on collateral issues.

Id. at 248-50.

2. ABA Standards

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice—Sentencing Standard 18-6.1 provides that the sentence should be no more severe than necessary to achieve societal purposes and to be consistent with the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the defendant, and the defendant's criminal history and personal characteristics.

B. Permissible sentencing considerations

1. Offense and offender

The sentencing judge should consider the facts and circumstances relevant to both the offense and the offender, i.e., both the crime and the criminal. See,Williams, 337 U.S. at 251; Jackson, 364 Md. at 199; Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 532 (1996). In Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 687 (1999), the Court of Appeals held that, although mistake of age is not a defense to statutory rape, it is a proper sentencing consideration.

In Mack v. State, 69 Md. App. 245, 254-55 (1986), the Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant's age, youth, and immaturity may be considered as mitigating factors, but the sentencing judge is not required to consider them. See also Williams v. State, 77 Md. App. 411, 424 (1988); Anthony v. State, 117 Md. App. 119, 130 (1997). In Hamwright v. State, 142 Md. App. 17, 42-43 (2001), the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court may consider charges over which only the juvenile court had jurisdiction.

2. Illegal confessions to other offenses

The sentencing judge may consider illegal confessions to other offenses when the statements were obtained by the State for purposes of prosecution and not for sentencing enhancement. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 486-87 (1981).

3. PSI report

The sentencing judge may consider information obtained during the preparation of the PSI report. See Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 133-34 (2001) (explaining that a court may consider other crimes evidence, prior bad acts evidence, and evidence of the defendant's institutional misconduct); Colvin-el v. State, 332 Md. 144, 166-67 (1993) (explaining that a court may consider the mental health portion of the PSI report); Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 294-95 (1990) (explaining that a court may consider the defendant's juvenile record and institutional record in the PSI report); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 432-33 (1990) (explaining that a court may consider information in the PSI report about the defendant's escape attempts and misconduct while incarcerated); Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 576 (1985) (explaining that a court may...