The Sense and Sensibility of Betrayal: Discovering the Meaning of Treachery through Jane Austen.

• Author: Jackson, Rodger L.

Introduction

In the past few years the charge of "betrayal" has become all too common. Yet, with all the fanfare and publicity attached to these charges, there has been surprisingly little written about what we even mean by the term. It clearly matters a great deal to us. An act of betrayal makes us appreciate Dante's reserving the innermost ring of the Inferno for the betrayers. We can even say there is a characteristic "feel" to betrayal. The betrayed experience powerful sensations of violation; they feel used and damaged. Betrayal, however, elicits more than strong feelings. Psychologists offer clinical evidence attesting to the devastating effects of betrayal. [1] Betrayal acts as an assault on the integrity of individuals, affecting the capacity to trust, undermining confidence in judgment, and contracting the possibilities of the world by increasing distrust and scepticism. [2] Betrayal changes not only our sense of the world, but our sensibility toward the world.

A charge of betrayal, then, must be taken seriously. While it may be that a particular case of betrayal is justified, the burden of offering that justification clearly belongs to the betrayer, not to the betrayed. Many, however, have been accused of betraying someone and felt wronged.

Distinguishing genuine instances of betrayal from those that are merely "felt."

They respond with outrage, defensiveness, or merely confusion. Sincerely believing their actions do not constitute betrayal, they do not feel obliged to offer justification. Instead they may demand explanations and apologies from the accuser, who already feels injured. Such conflicts raise the important question: how do we separate genuine instances of betrayal from merely "felt" instances? Psychological studies do little to illuminate this question, since such studies typically concern the effects of betrayal on an individual, and for this purpose it matters little whether the betrayal is genuine or not.

For the purposes of moral assessment, however, it surely matters a great deal whether an actual betrayal occurred. Further, because even a merely perceived betrayal ruptures trust and contaminates relationships for both parties, negative consequences may be mitigated if a legitimate interpretation of the incident can be offered. Refining and clarifying exactly what betrayal is, the context within which it occurs, and how it differs from other trust violations, may allow a more reasonable assessment of betrayal. Therefore, we must turn away from psychology and look to moral philosophy for enlightenment.

Unhappily, the philosophical literature does not offer as much help as one would like to sort through this issue. Two in-depth discussions of betrayal, however, are found in Judith Shklar's "The Ambiguities of Betrayal" [3] and Peter Johnson's Frames of Deceit. [4] Although Shklar deftly uncovers the many ambiguities surrounding betrayal and Johnson provides an excellent study of forgiveness, neither furnishes a detailed discussion of what the term 'betrayal' means. But only a clear sense of betrayal will allow the reasonable assessment that puts betrayal in its proper place.

For example, Shklar does at one point characterize betrayal as an act in which "one person should have both intentionally convinced another person of his future loyalty and then deliberately rejected him." [5] Yet she lists as "betrayals" such examples as experiencing the social mores and traditions one grew up with becoming outdated and being in a marriage where one partner outgrows the other. Shklar is interested in exploring our mixed feelings about such familiar experiences. To categorize these sorts of situations with Von Stauffenberg's betrayal of Hitler or Madame Bovary's infidelity, however, makes it very difficult to sort out the salient features of actual betrayals, assess them morally, or determine appropriate responses to them.

Both Shklar and Johnson argue, however, that trust and betrayal are best understood through a careful reading of literature. To some extent it is unsurprising that they look to literature rather than to philosophy for insight into betrayal. In literature, an event such as betrayal usually takes place in "full view" and accompanied by significant details about the characters, including their histories and environments. Further, in literature unlike philosophy, trust and betrayal are common themes. Shklar and Johnson each provides an assortment of alleged betrayals to consider, highlighting the character of individuals, their circumstances, and their motivations as important elements in assessing betrayal. Yet neither writer has a systematic way of differentiating between a genuine betrayal and a merely perceived betrayal. Such distinctions, however, are critical for moral assessment and for a reasonable interpretation of the event.

Theoretical and practical needs.

Betrayal is both a "people" problem and a philosopher's problem. Philosophers should be able to clarify the concept of betrayal, compare and contrast it with other moral concepts, and critically assess betrayal situations. At the practical level people should be able to make honest sense of betrayal and also to temper its consequences: to handle it, not be assaulted by it. What we need is a conceptually clear account of betrayal that differentiates between genuine and merely perceived betrayal, and which also provides systematic guidance for the assessment of alleged betrayal in real life.

In what follows I offer an account of betrayal that attempts to meet the two requirements of conceptual clarity and contextual adequacy. There is a great temptation to use the events in Washington of the past few years as the case study for such an analysis, but I believe that, for a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of viewing events from "within," this would only complicate matters rather than clarify them. Rather, like the authors cited, I too believe that betrayal in literature is fruitful ground for analysis. I have chosen Jane Austen's Sense and Sensibility for examples of trust and betrayal, because Austen displays the needed complexity and subtlety of human relationships and because she recognizes that violations of trust come in a variety of shades and colors. This particular novel, moreover, not only supplies multiple instances of trusting relationships gone awry, but also a common, detailed, and intelligible landscape within which these relationships exist.

Again, however, in order to illuminate betrayal and appropriately assess a purported betrayal, rich examples are not enough. We need a clear concept of betrayal. I will develop this concept by beginning with the related concept of trust. By starting with an explicit definition of trust and using this definition to analyze the various examples Austen provides, betrayal will emerge as but one of two types of violation of trust. This in turn will allow us to distinguish actual from merely "felt" betrayals. I will finally argue that understanding and being sensitive to the other form of violation of trust, which I call abandonment, may be even more significant to our moral life.

For the sake of brevity, I offer the following definition of trust, but will not argue for it here: [6] Trust is a disposition on the part of one person (the trusting party) to extend to another (the trusted party) discretionary power over something the truster values (the "object of trust") with the confident expectation that the trusted party will have the good will and competence to successfully care for it. [7]

Conditions for Violations of Trust

To trust is to risk disappointment.

In Austen's novel, we find many instances in which trust is disappointed. The definition of trust implies that the truster becomes vulnerable to the trusted party. Therefore, anytime we trust we risk disappointment in a number of ways. For example, the trusted could neglect or even intentionally harm the trust object. Yet how we assess moral culpability and how we should feel about the disappointment varies with the circumstances. It is important to note, both for the philosopher and the person who feels disappointed or betrayed, that there are at least two persons involved in a trust relationship. We can begin by assessing the truster's role in disappointment.

Warranted vs. Justified Trust

We must first distinguish between warranted trust and justified trust. Warranted trust means that, as a matter of fact, the trusted party does indeed possess the requisite competence and good will to successfully care for the object of trust. Comparing three examples of trusting in Sense and Sensibility helps make these distinctions clearer:

(1) Mrs. Dashwood trusts Mr. Dashwood to provide for her and their daughters.

(2) Elinor trusts Colonel Brandon with Marianne's happiness in marriage.

(3) Marianne trusts Willoughby with her future happiness in marriage.

To say that Elinor's trust in Colonel Brandon is warranted is to make the...