Self-Interest, Beliefs, and Policy Opinions

• Author: Gregory A. Huber,David J. Hendry,Alan S. Gerber,Daniel R. Biggers
• Published date: 01 March 2017
• Date: 01 March 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912916684032
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly

2017, Vol. 70(1) 155 –171

© 2017 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912916684032

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Article

A large body of research reveals that Americans’ attitudes

toward increased legal immigration are a function of

whether the immigrants in question are highly skilled or

low-skilled (Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hainmueller and

Hiscox 2007, 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit

2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Iyengar et al. 2013;

Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Sniderman, Hagendoorn,

and Prior 2004). Across studies, the American public is

substantially more supportive of admitting additional

highly skilled immigrants than admitting additional low-

skilled immigrants. However, the reason for this difference

in attitudes is not clear.

In an important recent study, Hainmueller and Hiscox

(2010) argue that the strong preference for highly skilled

immigrants seen among both low- and highly skilled

respondents shows that highly skilled American work-

ers—those whose wages are expected to be most

adversely affected by additional highly skilled immi-

grants—do not act in their economic self-interest. While

this conclusion is consistent with their data, we argue that

without direct measurement of individuals’ perceptions

of both the labor market threat and other potential eco-

nomic consequences posed by these types of immigrants,

it is premature to rule out economic self-interest as an

explanation for observed policy preferences. More spe-

cifically, until we know citizens’ beliefs about all of the

different economic pathways by which expanding highly

skilled or low-skilled immigration may affect them, we

cannot assess the extent to which immigration policy

preferences are related to economic self-interest.

Building on public opinion research that measures eco-

nomic concerns, this paper presents results from a novel

new survey of Americans’ beliefs about the consequences

of immigration and immigration policy. In a survey experi-

mental design, we measure respondents’ policy prefer-

ences about admitting highly skilled and low-skilled

immigrants, as well as their beliefs about the multiple

potential economic consequences of admitting additional

immigrants of a particular skill level—not only labor mar-

ket effects but also effects on household tax burdens,

access to government services, and the costs of goods and

services that households consume. In addition, we ask a

variety of questions about the perceived cultural and social

684032PRQXXX10.1177/1065912916684032Political Research QuarterlyGerber et al.

research-article2017

1Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

2University of California, Riverside, USA

3London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Corresponding Author:

Gregory A. Huber, Department of Political Science, Institution for

Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, 77 Prospect Street, P.O.

Box 208209, New Haven, CT 06520-8209, USA.

Email: gregory.huber@yale.edu

Self-Interest, Beliefs, and Policy

Opinions: Understanding How

Economic Beliefs Affect Immigration

Policy Preferences

Alan S. Gerber1, Gregory A. Huber1, Daniel R. Biggers2, and David J. Hendry3

Abstract

Research on how economic factors affect attitudes toward immigration often focuses on labor market effects,

concluding that, because workers’ skill levels do not predict opposition to low- versus highly skilled immigration,

economic self-interest does not shape policy attitudes. We conduct a new survey to measure beliefs about a range of

economic, political, and cultural consequences of immigration. When economic self-interest is broadened to include

concerns about the fiscal burdens created by immigration, beliefs about these economic effects strongly correlate

with immigration attitudes and explain a significant share of the difference in support for highly versus low-skilled

immigration. Although cultural factors are important, our results suggest that previous work underestimates the

importance of economic self-interest as a source of immigration policy preferences and attitudes more generally.

Keywords

self-interest, immigration, public opinion, political economy, cultural threat

156 Political Research Quarterly 70(1)

consequences of immigration, which permits an analysis

of the relative predictive power of personal economic,

sociotropic, and cultural factors. Overall, these new data

allow us to understand differences in how Americans per-

ceive immigrants of particular skill levels, as well as how

those perceptions correlate with policy attitudes toward

admitting specific types of immigrants.

Our analyses reveal several important patterns not pre-

viously explored. First, attitudes toward additional immi-

grants depend on a respondent’s own skill level. In

accordance with most basic economic accounts (Borjas

2003; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996), low-skilled

workers perceive a greater threat to their wages and

employment from low-skilled than highly skilled immi-

grants, while highly skilled workers perceive a greater

threat from highly skilled immigrants.1 When measured

directly, respondents appear to understand the likely labor

market consequences of different types of immigrants.

Second, for all dimensions of economic conse-

quences apart from the labor market, Americans believe

low-skilled immigrants will be worse for their house-

holds than highly skilled immigrants. Once we measure

beliefs about the full range of potential economic effects

of immigration, the preferences of highly skilled respon-

dents for highly rather than low-skilled immigrants

appear consistent with perceived economic self-inter-

est.2 Although others have examined economic influ-

ences outside of the labor market, this paper is to our

knowledge the first to measure citizen perceptions of all

these factors.3 Thus, despite perceiving similarly skilled

immigrants as more threatening to their labor market

positions, differences across individuals in negative

assessments of the overall household economic effects

of low-skilled immigration are more strongly correlated

with fears about their fiscal burden for both highly and

low-skilled respondents.

Third, measures of perceived economic self-interest

correlate with attitudes toward immigration policy and, in

part, explain differences in support for admitting addi-

tional highly or low-skilled immigrants. While our reli-

ance on survey data requires us to exercise caution when

describing the relationship between beliefs and policy

attitudes as causal, we continue to find that these percep-

tions explain policy attitudes after accounting for cultural

and sociotropic concerns. Overall, although cultural fears

and sociotropic economic factors play an important role

in explaining immigration attitudes, personal economic

concerns are also valuable for understanding variation

across both individuals and types of immigrants in sup-

port for additional immigration.

This work contributes to the literature about the role of

self-interest and symbolic considerations in shaping

immigration policy attitudes. Some previous research has

concluded that economic self-interest plays little role in

explaining mass attitudes toward immigration (Burns and

Gimpel 2000; Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2011;

Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller

and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and

Margalit 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Iyengar

et al. 2013; McLaren and Johnson 2007; but see Malhotra,

Margalit, and Mo 2013), a finding that is adduced as evi-

dence that economic self-interest fails to explain mass

attitudes toward public policy more generally (but see

Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Our findings suggest that

one reason for the apparent small role of self-interest in

explaining immigration policy attitudes may be measure-

ment problems. When economic self-interest is not con-

fined to labor market concerns alone, beliefs about

economic effects play a larger role in our understanding

of citizen attitudes about immigration than previously

documented.

Our results also provide guidance for policymakers. In

particular, politicians and elites must grapple with the

fact that citizens have beliefs not only about the labor

market and cultural effects of immigration, but also about

its non-labor market economic consequences. Dancygier

(2010) highlights the key role of local economic consid-

erations in explaining immigration policy conflict in

Europe, and several U.S. studies (e.g., Hopkins 2010;

Newman 2013) point to the role of changing local demo-

graphics in exacerbating local anti-immigrant concerns.

Our work shows that Americans appear to distinguish

between low- and highly skilled immigrants in forming

their beliefs about these other effects. In addition, these

data may help us understand the reason that changing

local conditions have large effects, because the effects of

new immigrants on local service use and access to exist-

ing services are likely readily visible to many natives.

Finally, and most generally, theoretical models of eco-

nomic self-interest rest on the critical assumption that

agents understand their own respective roles in the econ-

omy. However, past studies that assess the efficacy of

economic models as they relate to immigration policy

attitudes and other domains often rely on proxies of per-

ceived economic self-interest rather than citizens’ subjec-

tive perceptions of the ways in which policy can affect

personal economic concerns. Our argument is that an

appropriate measurement of economic self-interest must

assess citizens’ beliefs about their personal economic sit-

uations across the multiple dimensions in which policy

can affect economic well-being. In other policy domains,

where efforts are made to distinguish economic self-

interest from other explanations for policy preferences, a

key task is therefore to measure beliefs about the myriad

ways that policy can shape self-interest. That is, scholars

must measure beliefs about how the mechanisms they

propose are affected by interventions to properly evaluate

those models.