Section 9 First Amendment Limitations

• Library: Damages 2012

Before the constitutional developments in defamation law beginning in 1964, punitive damages were allowed in libel cases as in other intentional torts. The common law of defamation allowed recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss, and the existence of injury was presumed from the fact of publication.

In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a public official (and, in subsequent decisions, a public figure) from recovering actual damages or punitive damages without establishing actual malice. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); McQuoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1050, 1059 (W.D. Mo. 1980).

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the plaintiff’s status as a public or private figure, the states may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages in the absence of proof of actual malice. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); see also Englezos v. Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Williams v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 706 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986). Subsequently, the Supreme Court created a narrow exception to this rule by holding that recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases without a...