Section 9.39 Limits on Application of Exclusionary Rule

• Library: Criminal Practice 2012 Supp

1. (§9.39) Limits on Application of Exclusionary Rule

The Court has limited applicability of the exclusionary rule in a variety of ways. First, it has limited the nature of proceedings and persons to which the rule applies. In general, the rule does not apply to most noncriminal proceedings, seeImmigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deportation proceedings); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976) (civil tax proceedings), with the exception of forfeiture proceedings based on criminal conduct, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pa., 380 U.S. 693 (1965), or, in most cases, to pretrial or posttrial proceedings in a criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); see also United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (6^th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1034 (1994) (sentencing). See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.6(d) (4^th ed. 2004). It does not apply to license-revocation proceedings under § 302.505, RSMo Supp. 2004. Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333–36 (Mo. banc 1999). This is true even though an officer has no good-faith basis for stopping the motorist. Barlow v. Fischer,103 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).

The exclusionary rule precludes the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in the government’s case-in-chief, but such evidence may be used in some circumstances to impeach a defendant who testifies at trial. SeeUnited States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, § 11.6(a). While the Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized that illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief can be admitted on rebuttal to counter a defendant’s perjury, State v. Rutter,93 S.W.3d 714, 727 (Mo. banc 2002), it refused to extend Havens to allow use of the evidence in the government’s case-in-chief to rebut statements made in the defendant’s opening statement; such use must await defendant’s actual testimony at trial. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d at 727–28.

Moreover, because the exclusionary rule is designed “to deter police misconduct,” it only applies to illegal actions by police. Ariz. v.Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (quoting Ill. v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987), and United States v.Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)). Thus, when the alleged violation is the result of actions by someone other than the...