Section 9.25 Automobile Exception

LibraryCriminal Practice 2012 Supp

2. (§9.25) Automobile Exception

Although the Supreme Court has stated that the “word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears,” Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971), it is probably fair to say today that the characterization of something as a “vehicle” or “automobile” brings with it broad authorization to search not only the vehicle but also its contents. State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990) (characterizing the automobile exception as a “broad exception to the warrant requirement”). The exception also permits warrantless seizure of vehicles when there is probable cause to believe they are subject to forfeiture. Fla. v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999). Although some of this authorization comes from doctrines other than the automobile exception (see the general discussion of vehicle searches in §9.12 above, inventory of vehicles in §9.29 below, and search incident to arrest of occupants of vehicles in §9.33 below), courts have significantly expanded the automobile exception in recent years.

This exception to the warrant requirement originally derived from the exigent circumstances exception and was initially based solely on concerns regarding mobility of the vehicle. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Cal. v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). Although Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and subsequent cases continued to rely on mobility as the justification for the exception, by the middle of the 1970s, it was becoming clear that mobility alone could not justify so large an exception. Thus, in a series of cases beginning with Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), and continuing with the plurality decision in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the Court adopted a secondary rationale based on the lesser expectation of privacy a person has in a motor vehicle. Today, the courts explicitly recognize and rely on both rationales to uphold searches of vehicles in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 391–92; State v. Childress, 828 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992); State v. Ritter, 809 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991). In fact, the existence of these dual rationales allows courts to pick and choose the most appropriate, see, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 394, leading to extension of the exception well beyond what would have been justified by Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.

Courts have frequently indicated that, “[a]s a practical matter, exigent circumstances exist whenever an automobile is involved; the mere possibility that the vehicle can be moved is generally sufficient justification for a warrantless search.” Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d at 183 (and cases cited). Thus, no independent showing of exigency is required. Despite this, Missouri courts still, at times, appear to require a showing of exigency. See Ritter, 809 S.W.2d at 177–79. In Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996), the United States Supreme Court clearly and categorically reiterated that no such showing is required. “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.” Id. Thus, when probable cause exists, all that is necessary for the...

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