Section 7 Jurisdictionand Proof

LibraryJuvenile Law 2011

The juvenile court, or the family court in circuits with a family court, has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings alleging physical (or sexual or emotional) child abuse. Section 211.031.1, RSMo Supp. 2010. “Exclusive original jurisdiction” means that the juvenile court has authority to hear and determine charges of abuse as a trial court and that no other court has this authority. Only the juvenile officer may file an abuse petition under § 211.031. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dubinsky v. Weinstein, 413 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo. banc 1967).

The abuse petition must allege that “[t]he behavior or associations
of the child are . . . injurious to his or her welfare.” Section 211.031.1(2)(d).

Under § 210.110(1), RSMo Supp. 2010, “abuse” is not confined to acts committed by parents or guardians. The section defines “abuse” broadly to reach acts by persons “responsible for the child’s care, custody, and control.” These persons may include “other members of the child’s household, or those exercising supervision over a child for any part of a twenty‑four‑hour day [and] . . . any adult who, based on relationship to the parents of the child, members of the child’s household or the family, has access to the child.” Section 210.110(16).


Because abuse allegations focus on the child’s condition, the court may assume jurisdiction even without an allegation of the identity of the person who inflicted the abuse. “The focus is upon the children.” In re R.I.H., 842 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992). In In re D.L.W., 530 S.W.2d 388 (Mo. App. W.D. 1975), for example, the court affirmed the judgment removing the child from parental custody despite the parents’ contention that a babysitter, and not the parents, committed the acts of abuse that caused the child’s injuries. “It was not necessary to prove, as in a criminal case, whether the parents actually inflicted the injury or whether such injury was inflicted by someone else. The sole question for determination is whether or not the environment of this child was injurious to its welfare.” Id. at 391; see also, e.g., In re M__ R__ F__, 907 S.W.2d 787, 795 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (reaffirming D.L.W. when the petition did not specify the person who allegedly committed the abuse); C.R.K. v. H.J.K., 672 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) (“While there was insufficient evidence to establish the source of the alleged abuse, . . . there was sufficient competent evidence for the court to assume jurisdiction for the protection of the child.”).

Corollaries flow from the principle that abuse jurisdiction depends on the child’s condition and not on the perpetrator’s identity. First, the court may find the child abused—even if the parent did not inflict the injury—when the parent knew or should have known of the infliction by another person and took no action (or insufficient action) to protect the child. In In re K.L.B., 898 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995), for example, the juvenile court made a 10½‑month‑old child a temporary ward of the court based on evidence that she had been subjected to repeated acts of physical abuse producing scars, bruises, and other injuries that were in various stages of healing. The parties seemed to agree that no evidence indicated that the mother had inflicted any of the injuries. The mother contended...

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