Section 4 Limitations on the Municipal Taxing Authority

• Library: Tax Law 2009

The municipal taxing authority cannot go beyond the statutory provisions. To the extent that it does, it is invalid and unenforceable. Schoonover v. Lampe, 682 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). See also Adams v. City of St. Louis, 563 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. banc 1978), and Shively v. City of Keytesville, 238 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. App. W.D. 1951), both of which offer a detailed explanation of the consequences of a municipality acting beyond its statutory authority and the presumptions in favor of the taxpayer that supported the decision.

The limitations provided within the constitutional and statutory provisions are not simply limitations on the taxing authority of
the municipality, but also limitations to keep the legislature from improperly conferring such power. Bd. of Comm’rs of Tuberculosis Hosp. Dist. of Buchanan County v. Peter, 161 S.W. 1155 (Mo. banc 1913); see also State ex rel. Bd. of Control of St. Louis Sch. & Museum
of Fine Arts v. City of St. Louis, 115 S.W. 534 (Mo. banc 1908). The limitations on taxation by municipal corporations are set out in article X, § 3, of the Missouri Constitution as follows:

Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only, and shall be uniform upon the same class or subclass of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. All taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and shall be payable during the fiscal or calendar year in which the property is assessed. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the methods of determining the value of property for taxation shall be fixed by law.

As discussed in §§16.12–16.14 below, it is this provision that may present the greatest practical opportunity for violation by a municipal taxing authority, particularly in terms of offending public purposes and the uniformity requirements. With few exceptions, see Virden v. Schaffner, 496 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1105 (1973), the application of uniformity and public purpose requirements has remained stable and predominantly in favor of the taxing authority. See Bowman v. Kansas City, 233 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. banc 1950); Ams. United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. banc 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). See also State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, 61 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. banc 1933), for a discussion as to why the courts are inclined to find a tax not offensive to the uniformity requirement and as having been properly implemented or imposed.

While it is generally held that...