Section 4.8 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress’s Relationship to Other Laws and Torts

• Library: Tort Law 2016

G. (§4.8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress’s Relationship to Other Laws and Torts

Even though IIED constitutes elements of freestanding torts, "there is no independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the existence of the claim is dependent upon [the stand-alone tort]." K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. banc 1996). Duplicative recovery preclusion is logical because "[i]t would subvert the law of this state to allow Plaintiff’s claims for termination under the guise of tortious interference or emotional distress." Bishop v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 129 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004). Instead, "[a] separate emotional distress claim may ‘be supported by pleading some additional wanton and outrageous act[.]’" John Doe CS v. Capuchin Franciscan Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1134 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (quoting Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 (Mo. banc 1993)).

In short, when "conduct amounts to the commission of one of the traditional torts, such as battery, and the conduct was not intended only to cause emotional distress to the victim, the tort of intentional [infliction of] emotional distress will not lie." K.G., 918 S.W.2d at 799. IIED provides plaintiffs a remedy when actual damages from another tort cannot be proved. Both IIED and NIED are torts seen as "independent remedies available to recover mental anguish damages if no" other damages can be shown. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 813–14 (Mo. banc 2003).

Often, statutes of limitation bar prompt plaintiffs from reclassifying or disguising claims in the form of other torts. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that a claim for IIED does not lie when the offending conduct consists only of another tort, such as battery or defamation. Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. banc 1996) (citing Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d 303 (defamation)).

In Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010), the defendants operated a landfill and proposed building a trash transfer station on an adjacent parcel. At the Department of Health’s hearing regarding the transfer station, the plaintiffs disseminated a flyer to attendees calling Fred Weber, Inc. "THE TRASH TERRORISTS" and instructing opposition to the station’s construction. Upon learning of the flyer, Fred Weber, Inc. sought legal remedies:

· to stop circulation of the flyer;

· to stop the use of "terrorist" in connection with the company; and

· to ascertain the identities of

...