Section 3.80 Presumption of Validity

• Library: Local Government Deskbook (2017 Ed.)

2. (§3.80) Presumption of Validity

When an ordinance is in proper form and its subject matter is within the power of the governing body, there is ordinarily a presumption that it is valid in all respects unless there is some defect on the face of the ordinance itself. Manson v. Wabash R.R. Co., 338 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. banc 1960); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 203 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. banc 1947). But this presumption is rebuttable. Holland Furnace Co. v. City of Chaffee, 279 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. App. S.D. 1955); Williams v. City of Illmo, 279 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1955). Apparently, the “presumption of validity” means that the ordinance’s validity is not an issue in a judicial proceeding until the attacking party presents evidence of illegality in the procedures used in enacting the ordinance or in the substance of the ordinance.

The fact that an ordinance is long acquiesced in by the public and treated as valid by the various governmental departments strengthens the presumption of its validity. 6 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 20:6 (3^rd ed. rev. 2011).

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that a municipal council meeting was regularly held and was valid. See:

· City of Independence v. Peterson, 550 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. App. W.D. 1977)

· Scales v. Butler, 323 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Mo. App. S.D. 1959)

· Rutherford v. Hamilton, 11 S.W. 249 (Mo. 1889)

If proceedings were held at a special meeting, it will be presumed that the meeting was regularly called and held. If a proceeding was had as an adjourned meeting, unless the contrary is shown by the record, it will be presumed that the meeting was regularly adjourned. The adjournment may be proved only by the record of the proceedings. If nothing to the contrary exists in the record, there is a presumption that the adjournment was legal.

It is presumed that the legislative body intended to act within its authority, that it did not intend to violate the law, and that it intended to act validly. Wagner v. City of St. Louis, 224 S.W. 413 (Mo. 1920); Marks v. Bettendorf’s, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App. E.D. 1960). Unless the contrary appears to be the case, if an ordinance would be lawful if intended for one purpose, but unlawful for another, the presumption would be in favor of the lawful purpose. Milgram Food Stores, Inc. v. Ketchum, 384 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1964), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 801 (1965). The same presumption prevails with respect to the good...