Section 3.44 Sanctions Concerning Interrogatories

• Library: Discovery 2015

Under Rule 61.01(b), sanctions concerning interrogatories are available upon motion and reasonable notice for:

• failure to file timely objections or answers; or

• failure to file timely answers after objections have been overruled.

An evasive or incomplete answer is treated as no answer.

As opposed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, no distinction is made between a total failure to answer or object to all interrogatories and a failure to answer or object to some. In the latter situation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 requires a motion to compel answers, but such a motion is not required in either case in Missouri.

If sanctions are sought, the court may enter any order that is just, including:

• striking part or all of the pleadings;

• dismissing all or part of the action;

• entering a default judgment; or

• granting additional time to file answers if some reasonable excuse has been shown (reasonable excuse, however, cannot be based on the theory that the interrogatory was objectionable unless timely objections were filed or a protective order sought—Rule 61.01(a)).

If additional time is granted, the court must order that, if the answers are not then timely filed, the party’s pleadings will be stricken, the action dismissed, or a default judgment entered. Rule 61.01(b)(2).

It has been held that the striking of a party’s pleading and entry of a default judgment is appropriate, especially when the party to whom the interrogatories are propounded shows a deliberate disregard for the authority of the court in ordering answers. See:

• Portell v. Portell, 643 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982)

• In re Marriage of Dickey, 553 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Mo. App. W.D. 1977)

• Shannon v. Shannon, 680 S.W.2d 367, 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984)

• Russo v. Webb, 674 S.W.2d 695, 697–98 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984)

For additional authority sustaining the discretionary power of the trial court in dismissing a petition for failure to answer interrogatories, see:

• McVeigh v. Faith Hospital Ass’n, 647 S.W.2d 615, 615–16 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983);

• Amick v. Horton, 689 S.W.2d 369, 374–77 (Mo. App. S.D. 1985); and

• Baughn v. Rapidways Truck Leasing Co., 698 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Mo App. E.D. 1985).

It has been indicated that, although the authorities do not declare that a willful failure or refusal to answer interrogatories is a condition precedent to the imposition of sanctions and the entry of a default judgment, the authorities seem to lean strongly in that direction. Peoples-Home Life Ins. Co. v. Haake...