Section 22.14 Definitional Problems Regarding Seamen

• Library: Tort Law 2016

B. (§22.14) Definitional Problems Regarding Seamen

The threshold question of who is a "seaman" has created definitional problems as the term is not defined in the Jones Act. Of note, "seaman" is defined in 46 U.S.C. § 10101(3) as "an individual (except scientific personnel, a sailing school instructor, or a sailing school student) engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel." Also of note, the term "vessel" is defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 as including "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used . . . as a means of transportation on water."

Before 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court had been silent as to the precise relationship a maritime worker must bear to a vessel in order to come under the protections afforded by the Jones Act, leaving the lower federal courts the task of developing appropriate criteria to distinguish seamen from land-based maritime workers. In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995), the Court set forth a two-part test for determining who is a seaman under the Jones Act. First, an employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Id. at 368. Second, a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.

The Court recognized that the first prong is very broad and easily satisfied because virtually any employee assigned to a vessel contributes to its function. Recognizing that the second prong would likely create difficulties in interpretation by the lower courts, the Court found that a worker who spends less than 30% of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. Id. at 371. But the Court stated that the figure is a mere guideline and that departure will certainly be justified because the inquiry is fact specific. Id.

As to the second prong, two recent cases...