Section 21 Exclusive Causal Connection

• Library: Employment Discrimination 2008

The exercise of a right afforded under The Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law, Chapter 287, RSMo, must be the exclusive reason for the discharge or other discrimination for liability to result. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. banc 1998); Davis v. Richmond Special Road Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. App. W.D. 1983); Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. banc 1984).

Even though an exclusive causal connection is required, the causation standard may be met through indirect or circumstantial evidence. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), “burden-shifting” analysis recognized under federal discrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,as amended (Title VII), has been rejected by Missouri courts in cases for workers’ compensation retaliation under § 287.780, RSMo 2000. Hopkins v. Tip Top Plumbing & Heating Co., 805 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). “[The employee] sufficiently proved the elements of a claim of discriminatory discharge under § 287.780. It was then left to [the employer] to show that there was nevertheless a legitimate cause to discharge the employee other than for any exercise of right under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” Id. at 284. The Hopkins court found that the next step after the proffer of the employer’s legitimate reason for discharge is not the employee’s effort to prove pretext; rather, “[i]t is for the jury then to assess whether the cause attributed by the employer was pretext . . . and to...