Section 2.9 Final Judgments in General

• Library: App Ct Prac 2015 Supp

A. (§2.9) Final Judgments in General

Rule: A final judgment for purposes of appeal is one that is denominated a “judgment,” that is signed by the judge, and that disposes of all issues affecting all parties on the merits.

The thorniest issue in appellate practice is determining when a judgment is final for purposes of appeal. In general, a judgment is final when it disposes of all issues relating to all parties on the merits. E.g., Avidan v. Transit Cas. Co., 20 S.W.3d 521, 523 (Mo. banc 2000); Hill v. Boles, 583 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. banc 1979); Maurer v. Clark, 727 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987); Chura v. Bank of Bourbon, 674 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984). The purpose of the rule is to avoid the waste of time and money attendant on piecemeal appeals.

Because finality is a prerequisite to its jurisdiction, the appellate court must examine the issue regardless of whether the parties raise it. E.g., Maurer, 727 S.W.2d at 210; Gillespie v. Gillespie, 634 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982). The trial court’s characterization of its order as “final” is not necessarily controlling. MacMillan v. MacMillan, 960 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998); Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Peckham, Guyton, Albers & Viets, Inc., 747 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988). Unless the order is final or is properly certified under Rule 74.01(b) (see §2.19, infra), the appellate court must dismiss.

As a general rule, a judgment is “final” for purposes of appeal if it satisfies four tests:

1. The order must comply with the formal requirements of Rule 74.01.

Rule 74.01(a) provides that a “judgment is entered when a writing signed by the judge and denominated ‘judgment’ or ‘decree’ is filed.” The rule provides that the judgment may be either a separate document or a docket sheet entry that complies with the rule unless the docket entry expressly contemplates the court’s intention to enter a separate document; in that situation, the separate document is the judgment. Missouri courts hold that this rule has four elements: There must be “(1) a writing, (2) signed by a judge, (3) denominated ‘judgment’, and (4) filed.” River Salvage, Inc. v. King, 11 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). The first and fourth requirements have not been the subject of significant litigation. The other two have.

The purpose of the denomination requirement is to establish a “bright line” so that both judges and parties know when a judgment has been entered. City of St. Louis v. Hughes, 950 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Mo. banc 1997). Unfortunately, the line is not as bright as one might wish.

In Kessinger v. Kessinger, 935 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996), the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. On the same day, the trial judge wrote on the docket that “[t]he Court enters [j]udgment in favor of” the defendant and initialed the docket entry. Id. at 348. Four months later, the trial court filed a separate document styled “Judgment Upon Jury Verdict.” Id. at 349. The appellate court held that the initials constituted a signature. The court also held that the docket entry standing alone was a judgment and dismissed an appeal as untimely. Id. at 349.

Because the rule expressly provides that the judgment may be either a separate document or included on the docket sheet, the Kessinger, 935 S.W.2d 347, result is reasonable enough. But the court relied on older cases to hold that “the apparent intent of the trial judge as to whether an entry is the judgment remains an appropriate consideration.” Id. at 350. The trial court’s “apparent intention” is hardly susceptible to a bright-line test.

In Linzenni v. Hoffman, 937 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. banc 1997), a dissolution proceeding, the trial judge filed a letter to the parties on July 13, 1995. The letter recited “the court’s intention . . . that Judgment in the case is made this date,” id. at 724, and requested that the petitioner’s attorney prepare a formal decree. The trial court also filed a worksheet stating that the marriage was “ORDERED DISSOLVED.” Id. at 726. The petitioner died the next day, and the issue was whether the death abated the proceeding or whether the marriage had been validly dissolved before his death. The Supreme Court held that the worksheet stating that the marriage was “ORDERED DISSOLVED” was “unquestionably a valid order.” Id. at 726. The Court also held that Rule 74.01(a) was irrelevant because whether the dissolution proceeding had abated was a substantive issue not controlled by the rule. Linzenni, 937 S.W.2d at 726. Two judges dissented on the ground that there could be no final judgment absent compliance with the rule, and without a final judgment, the action automatically abated. Id. at 727.

As the dissent observes, Linzenni, 937 S.W.2d at 726, presents an especially compelling case for finding a valid final judgment. But it also presents a substantial likelihood of reintroducing the very confusion that the new rule was designed to prevent. The holding that “ORDERED DISSOLVED,” id. at 726, is sufficient to make a final judgment is not consistent with the rule’s requirement that it be denominated “judgment.” But it may be that the Court believed that the letter reciting the judge’s intent to enter final judgment sufficed. If so, then at least by implication, Linzenni approves the “apparent intent” of the...