Section 2.19 Standards for Certification

• Library: App Ct Prac 2015 Supp

1. (§2.19) Standards for Certification

Rule: An interlocutory judgment is final for purposes of appellate review if the trial court specifically determines that:

· the case involves multiple claims or multiple parties;

· the judgment finally disposes of the claims or parties adjudicated; and

· there is no just reason for delay in entry of final judgment.

Rule 74.01(b) provides, in pertinent part:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

This language is essentially the same as Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). In essence, it permits an immediate appeal from final orders involving claims properly separable from the remaining claims.

Rule 74.01(b) has three requirements:

1. Multiple claims or multiple parties.

Rule 74.01(b) permits an immediate appeal from an order that is sufficiently “separate” to warrant immediate appellate review. In the context of multiple parties, this is relatively simple. An order dismissing all claims against one defendant, or granting summary judgment on a third-party petition, is clearly “separable” from the remaining issues.

In the context of multiple claims, certification is proper only if the certified claims constitute separate claims. Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo. banc 1994). Committee for Educational Equality also holds that Rule 74.01(b) is “copied almost verbatim” from Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and that the cases construing the federal rule are “highly persuasive.” Id. If the judgment does not “dispose of all of the remedies sought as to any one claim for relief,” the judgment does not resolve an entire claim and it cannot be designated as final. Id. at 452.

To qualify as a “separate claim,” the judgment must dispose of a “distinct ‘judicial unit.’” Asbury v. Crawford Elec. Coop., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000) (quoting Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997)). Under this “judicial unit” test, “[a]n order dismissing some of several alternative counts, each stating only one legal theory to recover damages for the same wrong, is not considered an appealable judgment while the other counts remain pending . . . .” Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 655 S.W.2d 792, 793–94 (Mo. App...