Section 16.40 Child Hearsay Statutes and Other Nontraditional Statutory Exceptions

• Library: Evidence 2017

VII. (§16.40) Child Hearsay Statutes and Other Nontraditional Statutory Exceptions

Some cases inherently present difficult problems of proof that the traditional hearsay rules can only make worse. The legislature, as a matter of policy, has decided that in some instances—most prominently child abuse cases—the rules should simply be bent so that statements that would not pass muster under common-law rules will be admissible. In doing so, the legislature tried to build in enough safeguards that the party against whom the evidence is offered will have a fair chance to challenge the trustworthiness and reliability of the statement before it is used. See generally Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Child Hearsay Statutes, 71 A.L.R. 5^th 637 (1999).

The admission of evidence of prior bad acts in the “prosecution for crimes of a sexual nature involving a victim under eighteen years of age” is addressed in the Missouri Constitution after the 2014 amendment to article I, § 18(c). Under this evidentiary exception, evidence of prior criminal acts, whether charged or uncharged, is admissible “for the purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony or demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit the [charged] crime.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(c); State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, 506 S.W.3d 922 (Mo. banc 2017) (rejecting a constitutional challenge). The trial court may exclude this “relevant evidence” if the “probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id.; State v. Rucker, No. ED 103440, 2017...