Section 15.15 Utilization of the Writ

• Library: App Ct Prac 2015 Supp

D. (§15.15) Utilization of the Writ

For a discussion of when habeas corpus relief is available in Missouri, see State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993). Out of concern over “duplicative and unending challenges to the finality of a judgment,” a person cannot usually utilize a writ of habeas corpus to raise procedurally-barred claims—“those that could have been raised, but were not raised, on direct appeal or in a postconviction proceeding.” Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. banc 2000).

But there are rare exceptions and, in those instances, the cause and prejudice standard applies. The cause of procedural default “‘must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’” State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Mo. banc 2001) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). To establish prejudice, the habeas petitioner must show that errors at trial “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d at 215–16 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)).

The Supreme Court of Missouri also discussed procedural default in Brown v. State, 66 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. banc 2002), in which the Court held that:

[H]abeas corpus . . . provides the proper avenue for relief in those limited circumstances in which the petitioner asserts a claim that is of the type enumerated in Rule 24.035, but that is time-barred under that rule, if the petitioner can meet the “cause and prejudice” standard set out in State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, [63 S.W.3d 210 (Mo. banc 2001)].

Id. at 723.

Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, the only basis for relief is manifest injustice, which requires a showing that “‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,’ and further, ‘to establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light [of new evidence of innocence].’” Clay, 37 S.W.3d at 217 (citation omitted).

Clay also discusses the application of habeas relief to sentencing errors.

Errors during sentencing in non-capital cases are only actionable in habeas corpus if it is shown that the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence in question, as in the case where a court...