Section 15.11 Under §§ 72.400–72.430, RSMo

• Library: Local Government Deskbook (2017 Ed.)

4. (§15.11) Under §§ 72.400–72.430, RSMo

In 1989, the General Assembly passed H.B. 487 authorizing “any first class county with a charter form of government which adjoins a city not within a county” to establish a “boundary commission” with authority over all proposed boundary changes. Section 72.400.2, RSMo Supp. 1989. Later that year, the St. Louis County Council adopted an ordinance creating the St. Louis Boundary Commission. In 1990, the City of Hazelwood submitted a proposal to annex a portion of land; the proposal was approved by the St. Louis Boundary Commission and certified to the Board of Election Commissioners in November 1991. At the election, the annexation proposal passed; the City of Bridgeton and an individual property owner sued the City of Hazelwood claiming that the St. Louis County Boundary Commission law, now §§ 72.400–72.430, RSMo 2016, violated article III, § 40(30), of the Missouri Constitution. The Court found what was then § 72.400 unconstitutional on the grounds that the St. Louis Boundary Commission law was not open ended and there was no showing of substantial justification to exclude other counties. The Court found that suburban development did not stop at the St. Louis County border but rather extends at an increasing rate to St. Charles County; therefore, the legislation improperly applied only to St. Louis County. O’Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. banc 1993).

In State ex rel. City of Ellisville v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners, 877 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. banc 1994), the Court held that the 1992 legislative amendment to the St. Louis Boundary Commission law, making its provisions applicable to “any first class county with a charter form of government which contains a population in excess of nine hundred thousand” (§ 72.400.2, RSMo Supp. 1993), violated article VI, § 8, of the Missouri Constitution as it read at the time, requiring that “[a] law applicable to any county shall apply to all counties in the class to which such county belongs.” State ex rel. City of Ellisville, 877 S.W.2d at 621. The St. Louis Boundary Commission and St. Louis County argued that the Missouri Constitution placed first class cities in a special category and that, therefore, the mandates of article VI, § 8, did not apply. In essence, the St. Louis Boundary Commission and St. Louis County argued that article VI, § 18(a), of the Missouri Constitution authorized a fifth class of counties—charter counties. The Ellisville Court rejected the St. Louis Boundary Commission’s argument that the principles established in Leoffler v. Kansas City, 485 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Mo. App. W.D. 1972), applied to this case involving counties because Leoffler applied to cities, not counties. The Court reasoned that § 18(a), empowering counties to adopt a charter, had nothing whatsoever to do with the classification of counties. A first class county adopting a charter form of government remains a first class county for purposes of article VI, § 8. Accordingly, the Court again found that § 72.400.2 applied only to St. Louis County, could not...