Section 14 Preemption Issues

• Library: Employer-Employee Law 2008

Federal labor law, including the duty of fair representation (DFR), supersedes or preempts most claims that might arise between a
union and its members based on state law, including common law breach-of-contract or negligence actions. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368–69 (1990) (discussion of development of labor law preemption); id. at 371–72 (federal labor law preempts state tort claim against union). Labor law preemption entails interlocking doctrines that are sometimes poorly defined in the caselaw. The overarching policy behind the preemption of state claims against unions is the need for uniformity in the enforcement of federal labor law, including the DFR. The Supreme Court discussed in detail the importance of uniform interpretation and application of federal labor law across the country and the evolution of preemption as the means of carrying out that policy in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855–60 (1987) (cases cited). The Court explained: “Inasmuch as federal law must control the uniform meaning given to contract terms in a collective-bargaining agreement . . . , an employee’s state-law tort action that necessarily rests on an interpretation of those terms is pre-empted by § 301.” Id. at 859.

Without that preemption, collective bargaining agreements might be given one construction in state court or under state law and another under federal law. Moreover, many unions and employers enter into master agreements governing labor relations in multiple worksites across the country. Absent the primacy of federal labor law, the same collective bargaining agreement would be subject to potentially different rules of interpretation and, ultimately, varying substantive applications from state to state. Id.at 857–58.

More broadly, that sort of fractured legal framework would retard the compelling national interests Congress sought to protect through federal regulation of private sector labor relations. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (congressional findings that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (the Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., and its recognition of collective bargaining promote stabilization of wages and working conditions, avoid strikes or other disruptions in production, and generally enhance the flow of commerce). In San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1959), the United States Supreme Court recognized that Congress viewed the “centralized administration” of national labor policies and regulations to be essential to the purposes of the NLRA and considered the “diversities and conflicts” of “local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies” to be incompatible with those purposes. Accordingly, federal labor law displaces most state law that might otherwise affect either industrial relations between companies and unions or representation duties unions owe their members. As a result, union members generally cannot sue their unions using state law theories and common-law causes of action. See:

• Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10^th Cir. 2000) (“Where a plaintiff’s allegations fall within the scope of the duty of fair representation, federal labor law governs and ordinarily preempts any state-law claims based on those allegations.”) (cases cited)

• Carr v. Local Union 1593, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers
  326 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (D.N.D. 2004) (lack of Eighth Circuit precedent and citing authority from other jurisdictions)

By invoking the supremacy clause...