Section 14.38 Identity of Person by Identity of Name

• Library: Sources of Proof (2014 Ed.)

A. (§14.38) Identity of Person by Identity of Name

It is an established rule that the evidence of the name by which a person is known is not excludable hearsay. State v. Douglas, 573 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App. W.D. 1978). In Douglas, a waitress was allowed to testify that she thought a defendant’s name was Dale because she knew some people called him by that name.

The identity of a person may be proved presumptively, without any further showing, by evidence of the identity of a name. Longhibler v. State, 832 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. McKinney, 718 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986). In Brooks v. Roberts, 220 S.W. 11, 13 (Mo. banc 1920), the plaintiff’s evidence showed that he received deeds from the widow and heirs-at-law of John Connor of St. Louis County around the same time that a John Connor received a patent to the St. Louis County land in dispute. The Court referred to “the doctrine that identity of [a] person will be presumed from identity of name” and held that the two Connors were the same person. Evidence that there were other persons named Connor in St. Louis County at the time would only weaken the presumption, said the Court, not destroy it.

For the presumption to hold, the names must be the same. A difference between initials and a Christian name will not permit a presumption. “T.K. Shelby” and “Thomas K. Shelby” were not presumed to be the names of the same person by the Court in Woolridge v. La Crosse Lumber Co., 236 S.W. 294 (Mo. 1921). In that case, the signatures were alleged to be those of a trustee and a notary. Both signatures were required on the instrument and obviously could not be the signatures of the same person without invalidating the instrument. The Court ruled against the presumption and accepted the deed. See also State v. Johnson, 293 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Mo. 1956) (no presumption that “Wm. Andrew Johnson” and “William Johnson” were the same person).

The presumption is not conclusive and is, at best, prima facie evidence of the identity of the person. It can be shaken by the slightest proof of facts or circumstances that produce a doubt about identity. McKinney, 718 S.W.2d at 586; Jones v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 186 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. App. W.D. 1945). In Lucas v. Current River Land & Cattle Co., 85 S.W. 359 (Mo. 1905), the Court, after stating that a middle initial is not a material or necessary part of a person’s name, went on to hold that, without a showing that a Thomas Allen who died in the City of St. Louis was a resident...