Section 11.22 Waiver After Assertion of Right to Counsel: The Problem of Multiple Interrogations

• Library: Criminal Practice 2012 Supp

b. (§11.22) Waiver After Assertion of Right to Counsel: The Problem of Multiple Interrogations

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not address the issue of whether the police could conduct a second interrogation when the suspect previously invoked the right to counsel. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981), the Supreme Court addressed that issue and held that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, re-interrogation is permissible only if the suspect initiates the second interrogation and if the waiver during the second interrogation is knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the defendant initiated further conversation by asking a police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam), the Court held that an accused’s consent to a polygraph examination constitutes an initiation of interrogation, thereby waiving the right to counsel during a post-polygraph interrogation. The Supreme Court has also held that, if an accused has an attorney for one criminal charge, the police may still approach the suspect to discuss a different and unrelated criminal charge if they give the...