Section 1.6 Judicial Recognition of Probate Jurisdiction—Scope

• Library: Estate Administration 2014 Supp

A. (§1.6) Judicial Recognition of Probate Jurisdiction—Scope

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Estate of Basler v. Delassus, 690 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. banc 1985), marks a significant departure from the traditional view of probate jurisdiction. Before 1979, it was the universally accepted view that probate courts were courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing no greater powers than those conferred by statute and that jurisdiction could only be exercised in the manner prescribed by statute. In re Moore’s Guardianship, 148 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Mo. App. E.D. 1941); First Nat. Bank of Carrollton v. Vaughan, 248 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo. App. W.D. 1952). This view of probate jurisdiction caused appellate courts to search the statutes to find specific authority for the probate court’s action. State ex rel. Barlow v. Holtcamp, 14 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1929). “Their [probate courts’] functions are statutory.” Bauer v. Gray, 18 Mo. App. 164, 172 (E.D. 1885). From this philosophy emanated those cases declaring that probate courts lacked jurisdiction over trusts to issue injunctions or writs of habeas corpus, to determine title to real estate, or to decide cases purely equitable in nature. See §1.10, infra.

Basler, 690 S.W.2d 791, addressed the power of the probate division to approve a compromise of a claim for specific performance of an oral contract to purchase a tract of land owned by the decedent. The administrator ad litem negotiated a compromise of the plaintiff’s claim whereby the tract would be conveyed to the plaintiff for a net consideration of $60,000—three times the price the plaintiff alleged he agreed to pay—and the dismissal of the remainder of the plaintiff’s claims seeking recovery of some $300,000. The probate division approved the compromise over the objection of two of the devisees, who then appealed.

The appellants raised five issues on appeal, three of which were the following:

1. The plaintiff had not sought specific performance in accordance with §§ 473.303, 473.307, and 473.313, now RSMo 2000, of the Probate Code.

2. Section 473.427, now RSMo 2000, authorizing the compromise of claims, did not apply to a compromise involving title to real estate.

3. The statutory sale procedures prescribed by §§ 473.460, 473.490, 473.537, and 473.620, now RSMo 2000, were not followed.

In analyzing the appellants’ points, the Basler Court stated:

The general purposes of the [1980 Probate Code] revision were: (1) to upgrade the status of the probate courts by establishing them as divisions of the circuit court . . . including the granting of “general equitable jurisdiction”; (2) to vest broader discretion in personal representatives; and (3) to allow greater flexibility in the administration of estates.

The compromise of Earl’s claim with court approval is consistent with the letter and spirit of the 1980 revision. . . . We should not take a myopic view of the court’s powers because of inappropriate and outmoded analysis.

Basler, 690 S.W.2d at 794.

The Basler, 690 S.W.2d 791, view of probate...