Section 1.17 Abuse of Discretion

• Library: App Ct Prac 2015 Supp

b. (§1.17) Abuse of Discretion

The most deferential standard of review, the abuse of discretion standard, severely limits the power of the appellate court to reverse or otherwise alter the rulings of the lower court. Missouri courts have defined the term “discretion” as the option of doing or not doing that which a party does not have the absolute right to demand. Jennings v. City of Kansas City, 812 S.W.2d 724, 735 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). In both the federal and state courts of appeals, discretionary rulings are presumed correct, and the appellant has the burden of proving that there has been error. Danaher v. United States, 184 F.2d 673, 675 (8^th Cir. 1950); State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Mo. banc 1988). These courts will reverse a discretionary ruling only under certain limited circumstances.

In Missouri, reversal is warranted only when the lower court ruling is:

[C]learly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration; if reasonable men can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.

Id. at 804; see also State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Mo. banc 1999).

The Eighth Circuit has its own definition of what constitutes an abuse of discretion. The court has stated that simply because an act is discretionary does not mean that the district court is free to do whatever it pleases. The district court still must stay within the range of options offered by the applicable law. Thus, a federal district court abuses its discretion when it:

· fails to consider a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight;

· considers and gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor; or

· considers all proper and no improper factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.

Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8^th Cir. 1984).

Rulings relating to discovery are usually left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Moran v. Clarke, 247 F.3d 799, 807 (8^th Cir. 2001); State ex rel. Metro. Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Meyers, 800 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990). These include:

· rulings as to whether a physical examination is necessary, Fletcher v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 953 (8^th Cir. 1985); Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 241 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Mo. 1951);

· the selection of a physician for an examination, Fletcher, 757 F.2d 953; State ex rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992);

· rulings on objections to interrogatories, Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d...