SECTARIANISM AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN POSTWAR LEBANON.

• Author: Baroudi, Sami E.

INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE SECTARIAN BALANCE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLAR Ernst Haas observed that the term "balance of power" has at least eight separate meanings. [1] The concept of "sectarian balance" is equally elastic and carries a variety of meanings. One can identify at least six distinct ways in which the term sectarian balance has been used in the Lebanese context. First, an equitable distribution of seats, or positions (say in a certain organization, the civil service, or the Board of Directors of a major economic association) between the main sects. Second, equal representation of Muslims and Christians, and Sunnis and Shi'is, in all major decision-making bodies [2]. Third, the "right" of every sect to independently select its representatives to important decision-making bodies. Fourth, a conscious policy, by a group or by the government, aiming at preserving, or restoring, the sectarian balance. Fifth, a state of equilibrium in the relations between Christians and Muslims, where neither religious group dominates. Sixth, and finally, a st ate of equilibrium in the relations among the main sects, without any sect exerting hegemony over the rest.

Here I would like to caution that my aim is not to legitimize Lebanon's confessional system, and its consequences as regards the sectarian composition of the governing bodies of the country's leading business associations. Rather, I try to show how such a composition follows a broad pattern that is best captured by the concept of sectarian balance. I am also sure that critics of the sectarian system will find even more problems with my concept of sectarian balance than the critics of Realism have found with the more established concept of balance of power. In short, I do not seek to unproblematize Lebanon's confessional system or the enduring tendency of operating by the government and societal groups alike within a framework defined by various sectarian balances [3]. The confessional system has been responsible for many frictions and conflicts within the Lebanese polity and has stifled the development of a secular and civil society. Nevertheless, successive governments and most societal groups have treated such a system as a given, and chose to operate within its contours, rather than attack its foundations. Finally, it is worth pointing out that looking at business associations from a sectarian perspective does not negate the need for examining other, and equally valid, questions about them, such as how they articulate the interests of their members, what strategies they follow in dealings with government and labor, and how effective they have been in influencing government policy.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN LEBANON

Lebanon has a rich associational life, with labor unions, business and professional associations, and other interest groups all trying to exert a measure of influence over government policy. Private sector dominance in the Lebanese economy, and a relatively open political system, led to the formation of scores of associations that represent business interests. Business associations can be divided into national associations and sub-national or regional ones. At the national level, the most powerful associations are the Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI) and the Association of Lebanese Banks (ALB). Less important (but not inconsequential) national associations include the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture of Lebanon, the Assembly of Lebanese Businessmen, the Association of Insurance Companies, the Syndicate of Hotel Owners, and the syndicate of Bakery owners. The number of regional business associations (tajamu'at mantaiqiyyat) is considerably larger. The most important re gional associations are the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in Beirut and Mount Lebanon -CCIAB -- (the other four Chambers of Commerce and Industry are not as important), and the Beirut Traders Association. Of lesser importance are the other regional associations of merchants and industrialists. [4] Limitations of time and space prevent me from analyzing the sectarian composition of the governing bodies of all (or most) business associations in postwar Lebanon, although doing so is an enterprise task worth undertaking in a larger (and better funded) project.

THE BEIRUT TRADERS ASSOCIATION (JAM'IYYAT TUJAR BEIRUT)

The Beirut Traders Association (BTA) was established in April 1921, making it the oldest business grouping in Lebanon. [5] The historical dominance of the trade sector in the Lebanese economy, and the central role played by Beirut in the economy made the Association a fairly powerful body in the prewar (pre-1975) era. Since neither Christians nor Muslims dominated the trade sector in the capital, the difference between the number of Muslims and Christians on the Association's Board of Directors (Majlis al-Idarat) was either small, or nonexistent. [6] As the Shi'is and Druze had little economic presence in Beirut prior to the war, the Association's Board included far more Sunnis than Shi'is and no Druze. On the Christian side, the Greek Orthodox and Maronites were roughly equally represented, with smaller representation for the Catholics. By convention ('urf), the president of the Association is a Greek Orthodox, and the vice-president and general secretary are Sunnis. To provide a better idea about the prewa r sectarian balance, table I below shows the sectarian composition of the Association's Board of Directors that was elected in 1972 (last prewar election).

THE LEBANESE WAR AND THE BEIRUT TRADERS ASSOCIATION

The Lebanese War, 1975-89, rendered the BTA, and other long-established business groups, virtually ineffective. According to the Association's s former president, Victor Kassir, "the Association had to cease its activities during the war because it was difficult for its members to move from one part of Beirut to another and meet in one location." [7] In the words of the Association's Sunni secretary general, Rabah Idrisse (1972-1998), the "war paralyzed the Association, as members (of the Board) could not meet to follow up on problems and pursue the priorities of the trade sector." [8] Despite the Association's near paralysis, economic transactions were maintained between merchants from the two sides of Beirut. [9] To paraphrase Idrisse, "at times essential supplies had to be brought in to West Beirut from the ports of Jounieh and Dbeieh (in then Christian dominated Lebanon)... at other times all of Lebanon had to be supplied from Southern ports (in then Moslem dominated Lebanon)". [10]

One major consequence of the Lebanese War was the increase in the demographic and economic presence of the Shi'is in Western Beirut. Accommodating the demands of Shi'i businessmen (and Shi'i politicians) for greater representation on the Association's Board of Directors was to prove one of the thorniest issues to confront the Beirut Traders Association in the postwar years. As will be seen later, the leaders of virtually all long established and sectarianly mixed economic associations had, in the postwar years, to work out arrangements with Shi'i businessmen (and Shi'i politicians) that, in general, increased the representation of Shi'is on their governing bodies. The politics surrounding the augmentation of Shi'i presence on the governing bodies of leading business associations will be examined with some detail in subsequent parts of the article.

THE FIRST POSTWAR ELECTION

The first postwar election for a new Board of Directors, to replace the one elected twenty years earlier, took place on 10 April 1994 and produced, for the first time in the Association's history, a Sunni dominated Board. Table 2 below shows the sectarian composition of the Association' Board of Directors elected in April 1994.

Only ten Christian Board members were elected as compared to fourteen Sunnis, giving the latter an absolute majority on the Board of Directors. Not a single Shi'i member was elected due to the withdrawal of all Shi'i candidates from the race following a dispute over the size of Shi'i representation in the 24 member Board of Directors, and the posts that would be reserved for Shi'is on the Bureau of the Board (the Board's executive body). According to sources, the Shi'is demanded six or seven seats on the Board, and either the vice-presidency, or the general secretariat of the Association, demands that were unacceptable to the Sunni merchants, and their political backers. [11]

Lengthy and acrimonious negotiations lasting till a few hours before the 10 April election between representatives from al-Nadwah al-Iqtisadiyyah (an almost exclusively Sunni group of businessmen) and the seven Shi'i candidates to the election failed to resolve the so-called "Shi'i problem or complex." [12] Complicating the problem was the presence of many powerful Christian and Sunni candidates who would not withdraw from the race to make room for the Shi'is on the Board. [13] No agreement could be reached either between the al-Nadwat al-Iqtisadiyyat and the Christian dominated Rally of Lebanese Businessmen (Tajamu' Rijal al-A 'ml al-Lubnaniyyin) usually referred to by its French name Rassemblement des Dirigeants et Chefs d'Entreprises Libanais -- RDCL --), partly because the RDCL could not agree on a short list of candidates due to internal competition among its members, and partly because some members of al-Nadwat al-Iqtisadiyyat were trying to lower the number of Christians on the Board in a last ditch e ffort to create more room for the Shi'is. [14] As a result, only one Sunni dominated list (14 Sunnis to 10 Christians) drawn, at the last minute, by al-Nadwat al-Iqtisadiyyat contested the election and won in its entirety. [15]

Not only was the victorious list unbalanced, but the way merchants voted reflected their sectarian affiliations. The Shi'i block of merchants boycotted the election, and so did many Christian merchants. The Sunni...