Secondary Meaning Surveys

• Author: Vincent N. Palladino
• Pages: 79-100

79

5

Secondary Meaning

Surveys

By Vincent N. Palladino

INTRODUCTION

Thischapterconsiders surveys thatseek toassess whetheraword,

name, symbol, ordevice hasachieved trademarkstatus byacquir-

ing secondary meaning.1The next section explainsthe natureofthat

inquiry.The thirdand fourthsectionsfocus on surveys thatpurport

toaddress secondary meaning directly.Theyexplorehowsecondary

meaning surveys should be done and whycertain surveytechniques

literallymiss the mark. The fifthsection brieflyconsiders the useof

genericness and likelihood of confusion surveys toassess secondary

meaning. The sixthsection closeswithabrief summary and comments

on why,insome respects atleast,secondary meaning surveydesign

maybe amatterof common sense.

1. Otherdiscussionsof secondary meaning surveys include VincentN. Palladino,

Surveying Secondary Meaning, 84 TR. 155 (1994), an updateofVincentN.

Palladino, Techniques for Ascertaining If There Is Secondary Meaning, 73 T

R. 391 (1983);VincentN. Palladino, Secondary Meaning Surveys in Light of Lund,91

TR. 573 (2001);VincentN. Palladino, Assessing Trademark Significance:

Genericness, Secondary Meaning and Surveys, 92TR. 857(2002);Robert

H. Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based Survey Methods,

4J.M R.I. P. L. 91, 107–09(2005) ( citing VincentN. Palladino,

Surveying Second Meaning, 84 TR. 155 (1994));William F. Gaske, Trade

Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an Alternative to Secondary Meaning,

57F L. R.1123,1135–36 n.104(1989) (“Foran in-depthdiscussion of

howtodesign questionstomeasuresecondary meaning, see Palladino Techniques

for Ascertaining If There Is Secondary Meaning, 73 TR. 391 (1983);

Lawrence E. Evans,Jr.&David M. Gunn, Trademark Surveys,79TR.

1, 16–17(1989) ( citing VincentN. Palladino, Techniques for Ascertaining If There Is

Secondary Meaning,73 TR. 391 (1983));98 A.L.R. F. 20,27 (1990).

Section III

80

Twocaveats areinorder.First,designing sound surveyquestionscan be daunt-

ing. Even minorwordchangescan materiallyaffecthowaquestion isunderstood.2

Further,questionsthattrack legal doctrine maynotfarewell when put tothe public,3

while moreuser-friendlyquestionsmayfail toaddress alegal issuesquarely.4The

sample questionsproposed in thischapterarejust that:samples.Inpractice, theymay

need toberefined bylawyers and surveyexperts working together.5

The second caveatconcernsthe valueofsecondary meaning surveys and, indeed,

litigation surveys generally.Surveys in litigation areevidence.6Like most evidence,

theyareimperfectand should notbe discarded on thatground alone.7Conversely,they

should notbe accorded unduerespectasabranch of science thatissomehowbeyond

the purviewof the lawyers who try casesand the judgesand jurieswho decide them.8

Secondary meaning surveys should be considered along withotherevidence—orthe

absence of otherevidence—thatbears on whetheraclaimed trademarkhasacquired

2.See Jacob Jacoby,AmyH. Handlin &AlexSimonson, Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising

Cases Under the Lanham Act: An Historical Review of Comments from the Bench, 84 TR.

541, 562 (1994) (“Surveyresearchers aregenerallyawarethattwoslightlydifferentquestionson the

same topic mayelicittwoentirelydifferentanswers.”);ShariSeidman Diamond, Reference Guide on

Survey Research in R M  S E 387(Federal Judicial Center3ded.,

2011) [hereinafterDiamond] (“Even questionsthatappearclearcan conveyunexpected meaningsand

ambiguitiestopotential respondents.”).

3.See Sunbeam Corp. v.Equity Indus.Corp., 635F.Supp. 625, 630 (E. D. Va. 1986)(criticizing

question becauserespondents are“totallyunversed in ...trickymarketing and legal distinctions”), aff’d

without op., 811 F.2d1505(4thCir.1987);Diamond, supra note2(in rejecting question “court noted that

the phrase‘compensating damages,’although well-defined toattorneys,wasunlikelytobemeaningful

forlaypersons”).

4. CompareE.I.DuPontdeNemours &Co.v.YoshidaInt’l, Inc., 393F. Supp. 502,519– 20(E.D.N.Y.

1975) (according surveysome weightwhile observing that“‘the factthatone markmaybring another

marktomind doesnotin itself establishlikelihood of confusion astosource”)withExxon Corp. v.Xoil

EnergyRes., Inc., 552F. Supp. 1008, 1026 n.16(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rejecting outrighta“comestoyour

mind”question in likelihood of confusion survey).

5. On the need forand valueoflawyer-expert cooperation in surveydesign, see, e.g., Robert C.

Sorensen, Survey Research Execution in Trademark Litigation: Does Practice Make Perfection? 73

TR. 349 (1983);Alfred T. Lee, The Structure and Uses of Survey Evidence in Trademark

Cases: The Legal Aspects—A Trap for The Unwary, 67 TR. 120,126–27 (1977);Solomon

Dutka, The Structure and Uses of Survey Evidence in Trademark Cases: AStatistician’s Perspective, 67

TR. 101, 106 (1977).

6.Priortothe acceptance of surveys,consumertestimonyregarding secondary meaning wasthe order

of the day.See, e.g., 2H D. N,T L UC  T-M§334,

at1041 (4thed. 1947)(“The best directevidence of secondary meaning isthe testimonyof consumers.”).

7.See Lawrence E. Evans,Jr.&DavidM. Gunn, Trademark Surveys,79TR. 1, 35(1989)

(“Surveys arenotperfect.”);HansZeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence,45C L. Q. 322,

330 (1960)(“the lawisaccustomed todealing withless than perfectevidence”);IndianapolisColts,Inc.

v.Metro. BaltimoreFootball Club, 34F.3d410,416(7thCir.1994) (“Trialswould be very short if only

perfectevidence wereadmissible.”).

8. In The Admissibility and Use of Opinion Research Evidence, 28N.Y.U. L. R.1213,1221 – 22

(1953), Robert C. Sorensen and TheodoreC.Sorensensuggest thatitwasbyappealtoscientific reliability

thatsurveys first gained acceptance in litigation. However,while arguably“scientific,”litigation surveys

remain “evidence.”See, e.g., Diamond, supra note2at387 – 408;Alfred T. Lee, The Structure and Uses of

Survey Evidence in Trademark Cases: The Legal Aspects—A Trap for the Unwary, 67 TR.

120,126– 27 (1977);Solomon Dutka,The Structure and Uses of Survey Evidence in Trademark Cases: A

Statistician’s Perspective,67 TR. 101, 106 (1977).