Scruples. Corporate Family and Thrust-Upon Conflicts

AuthorMichael Downey
Pages64-64
Published in Litigation, Volume 46, Number 2, Winter 2020. © 2020 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not
be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 64
Scruples
MICHAEL DOWNEY
The author is a legal ethics lawyer at Downey Law Group LLC, in St. Louis.
“If a client does something mid-represen-
tation that creates a conflict for another
client, do we have to terminate both rep-
resentations?” Paradox asked.
“What did the first client do to create the
problem?” Ethox responded.
“We defend ACME in cases alleging de-
fects in ACME’s rocket sleds. Other law-
yers at our firm represent Big Corporation,
which is acquiring patents from Inventors
LLC. We learned that ACME is acquiring
Inventors LLC,” Paradox said. “So now we
represent Big Corporation as buyer of pat-
ents and, through ACME, Inventors LLC as
the potential seller of those patents.”
“That may be a problem,” Ethox empa-
thized. “But the right thing to do here may
not be so clear-cut.”
“Why?” Paradox asked.
“Because we need to figure out whether
ACME’s acquisition of Inventors prevents
us from being adverse to Inventors,” Ethox
answered.
“The American Bar Association Formal
Opinion 95-390 states that a lawyer’s rep-
resentation of one corporate entity does not
automatically disqualify the lawyer from be-
ing adverse to all related corporations.
“ABA Model Rule 1.7 comment 34 states
that a lawyer who represents a corpora-
tion or similar entity does not necessarily
represent all corporate affiliates. Instead,
a disqualifying conflict exists only where
the circumstances are such that the affili-
ate should also be considered a client of
the lawyer, where the lawyer and client
have agreed that is how corporate family
conflicts will be handled, or where other
circumstances indicate the lawyer’s repre-
sentation adverse to the corporate affiliate
would likely be materially limited such that
there is a Rule 4-1.7(a)(2) conflict.
“What agreement might a lawyer and cli-
ent have?” Paradox asked.
“Sometimes corporations use standard
engagement terms that say if a law firm
representing one corporate entity should
be deemed to represent all corporate affili
-
ates as if they were a single entity,” Ethox
answered. “Then all the corporate affiliates
would need to be considered clients for pur-
poses of analyzing conflicts.
“Other times, a law firm will include lan-
guage in its engagement agreement that it
represents only a specific corporation, and
not any of its affiliates. This should help the
lawyer avoid disqualification from matters
adverse to corporate affiliates.”
“I did not see any language like that,”
Paradox said. “So what types of circum-
stances create problems in a corporate fam-
ily conflict?”
“The inquiry is fact-driven,” Ethox an-
swered. “Is ownership the same? Are the
same corporate officers and in-house coun-
sel involved? Are they all officed at the same
location? Those types of issues. If two cor-
porate affiliates operate as one entity, then
a lawyer representing one corporate entity
will likely be prevented from taking a mat-
ter adverse to the other, without consent.
“Inventors LLC was merging all its op-
erations, including in-house counsel, into
ACME,” Paradox said. “ACME’s lead patent
lawyer is also getting involved in the pat-
ent sale.”
“Then we probably need to consider the
corporate family conflict a problem,” Ethox
agreed. “The next issue is whether we can
get consent.
“Will ACME and Big Corporation allow
us to continue handling both representa-
tions—defending ACME in the rocket sled
cases while negotiating opposite ACME’s
subsidiary in the patent sale? Here, every-
one knows about the patent deal, so improper
client confidences should not be a problem.”
“What if we cannot get consents?”
Paradox asked. “Will we need to withdraw
from both representations?”
“Possibly. But the conflict that arose when
ACME purchased Inventors LLC is known
as a ‘thrust-upon’ conflict,” Ethox said, “be-
cause neither our firm nor Big Corporation
caused the conflict. Under Rule 1.7 comment
5, we may be forced to withdraw from only
one conflicted representation—here, prob-
ably the ACME representation—while con-
tinuing to handle the other.
“But let’s first see if we can get consent
from Big Corporation and ACME,” Ethox
counseled Paradox. “Both may be willing to
waive the conflicts, particularly if we agree to
create an ethics screen between the lawyers
working for ACME and those negotiating for
Big Corporation against Inventors LLC.” q
CORPORATE FAMILY
AND THRUST-UPON
CONFLICTS

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