SC Lawyer, May 2005, #2. Where do we go from here? Recent changes in South Carolina's venue laws.

• Author: By John R. Bell Jr., Daniel B. White and Ronald K. Wray II

South Carolina Lawyer

2005.

SC Lawyer, May 2005, #2.

Where do we go from here? Recent changes in South Carolina's venue laws

South Carolina Lawyer May 2005

Where do we go from here? Recent changes in South Carolina's venue lawsBy John R. Bell Jr., Daniel B. White and Ronald K. Wray IIThe past few months have seen significant developments in the law of venue, both judicially and legislatively. The Supreme Court in Whaley v. CSX Transportation, Inc. clarified the law of venue, and shortly thereafter the legislature rewrote the general venue statute, § 15-7-30. Most significantly, the changes in the common and statutory law limit where corporations and other business entities can be sued. The changes are sure to present a challenge to the legal community as lawyers and judges attempt to discern how and when to apply the new standards for venue.

The Whaley decision

The first major development with regard to the law of venue came from the Supreme Court's decision in Whaley v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Op. No. 25935 (South Carolina Supreme Court decided February 2, 2005). In Whaley, the Court reversed a $1 million verdict on behalf of the plaintiff, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the case to proceed in an improper venue.

Underlying facts

Whaley arose from an incident that occurred on May 24, 2000, while the plaintiff, Danny Whaley, was working as a locomotive engineer for CSX. Whaley claimed that while working on a hot South Carolina day he became ill and required medical treatment, allegedly due to excessive heat on the locomotive. He alleged that his illness caused him to lose his ability to perspire and also caused heart problems that ultimately required installation of a pacemaker. Whaley filed suit against CSX under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) and the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA).

Despite the fact that Whaley lives in Abbeville County, where his family has resided since the 1760s, and despite the fact that the incident at issue occurred while Whaley was working a local job that ran from Greenwood to Laurens and then back to Greenwood, Whaley chose to file his suit in Hampton County. In pre-trial hearings, CSX sought a transfer of venue, arguing that venue was improper in Hampton County because it did not reside in Hampton County as required by § 15-7-30, the general venue statute. Additionally, CSX argued that even if the case could properly be filed in Hampton County, it should be transferred to Greenwood County pursuant to § 15-7-100(3) based on the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice.

The trial judge denied CSX's motion to transfer venue, finding that CSX did reside in Hampton County because it owned property and transacted business there. In reaching his decision, the trial judge relied upon the 1980 decision in In re Asbestosis Cases, 274 S.C. 421, 266 S.E.2d 773 (1980), in which the Supreme Court had construed language formerly found in a service of process statute, § 15-9-210, to find venue proper in any county in which a corporate defendant owns property and transacts business. The trial judge also found that he did not have discretion to transfer the case based on the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice because a provision in § 36-2-803(2), South Carolina's long arm statute, provides that when jurisdiction is based solely on the long arm statute, a trial judge is not permitted to transfer venue for the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice.

Ultimately, the case was tried to a jury in Hampton County, and the plaintiff was awarded a $1 million verdict. CSX appealed.

Appellate proceedings

As with most cases, CSX filed its notice of appeal...