Says Who? An Experiment on Allegations of Corruption and Credibility of Sources
| Author | Sandra Botero,Nara Pavao,Rodrigo Castro Cornejo,David W. Nickerson,Laura Gamboa |
| Published date | 01 September 2015 |
| Date | 01 September 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912915591607 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2015
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2015, Vol. 68(3) 493 –504
Says Who? An Experiment on
© 2015 University of Utah
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Allegations of Corruption and
DOI: 10.1177/1065912915591607
prq.sagepub.com
Credibility of Sources
Sandra Botero1, Rodrigo Castro Cornejo2, Laura Gamboa2,
Nara Pavao2, and David W. Nickerson3
Abstract
To hold politicians accountable for corrupt practices, voters must rely on reports from third parties and view these
accusation sources as credible. We conducted a survey experiment varying sources for corruption accusations
and measuring citizens’ evaluations of political candidates in Colombia. Consistent with prior surveys, we find that
respondents trust newspapers more than the judiciary or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Corruption
accusations coming from the leading national newspaper drive down levels of support and trust for corrupt politicians
relative to identical accusations made against identical candidates by NGOs and the judiciary. Our results also indicate
that people with lower levels of education were more responsive than more educated individuals to corruption
accusations coming from newspapers when compared to those coming from the judiciary or an NGO. Perceptions of
candidate competence did not move with perceived trustworthiness.
Keywords
political corruption, voter information, watchdog agencies, Latin American politics, democratic accountability
Introduction
the source attributed to a corruption accusation. The three
sources included an electoral monitoring nongovernmental
Information about candidates’ prior behavior is widely
organization (NGO), a court, and a well-respected national
assumed to be crucial for empowering voters in electoral
newspaper. These three organizations were selected
democracies.1 All things being equal, voters would prefer
because they are central actors in an electoral accountabil-
to reject corrupt politicians because of the inefficiency
ity process that hinges on the availability of information.
and injustice inherent in the practice of corruption (Maloy
Colombia is an excellent case for the study because it fea-
2014).2 However, to hold corrupt politicians accountable,
tures a reputable national newspaper, a relatively indepen-
voters need to be aware of their past behavior. As voters
dent judiciary, and credible NGOs. All things being equal,
do not typically observe corrupt behaviors by elected
at the aggregate level, credible sources should be more
officials directly, they must rely on reports from third par-
influential than sources deemed less credible.
ties, and the credibility of different sources reporting cor-
Consistent with Latin American Public Opinion
ruption accusations may vary in the minds of voters. This
Project (LAPOP) results for Colombia, our sample trusts
paper uses a survey experiment in Colombia to under-
newspapers more than they trust NGOs and courts,3 so
stand what sources of corruption accusation are viewed
we expect corruption accusations coming from newspa-
as most credible and whether this variation in the credi-
pers to drive candidate evaluations down more than accu-
bility of sources of information has an impact on the way
sations from NGOs or the judiciary. Controlling for
individuals evaluate politicians accused of corruption.
To this end, we fielded a survey experiment in
1
Colombia, varying sources of corruption accusations and
Willamette University, Salem, OR, USA
2
measuring citizens’ evaluations of political candidates.
University of Notre Dame, IN, USA
3Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
We focused on a country with non-negligible levels of
perceived corruption and competitive elections. Our sur-
Corresponding Author:
vey presented all respondents with the biographical
David W. Nickerson, Department of Political Science, Temple
University, 1115 Polett Walk, 4th Floor Gladfelter Hall, Philadelphia,
sketch of a hypothetical corrupt candidate running in the
PA 19122.
upcoming congressional elections and randomly varied
Email: david.nickerson@temple.edu
494
Political Research Quarterly 68(3)
baseline levels of generalized trust, whether or not the
Fisher 2011; Pattie and Johnston 2009), and Spain
respondent is partisan, and other relevant variables, we
(Costas, Sole-Olle, and Sorribas Navarro 2010; Rivero
find that corruption accusations coming from the leading
Rodriguez and Fernandez Vazquez 2011), for example,
national newspaper reduce the likelihood of both voting
document the limited electoral punishment corrupt gov-
for and trusting the corrupt politician relative to accusa-
ernments often face.
tions from NGOs or the judiciary. As an important check
In the last decade, experimental designs have been fre-
on our findings, this newspaper effect does not exist
quently employed to isolate the effect of corruption
among respondents who view either courts or NGOs as
information on voters’ attitudes and behavior. However,
more trustworthy than newspapers. Interestingly, people
these studies have provided mixed and possibly contra-
with low levels of education were more responsive to
dictory results. Although a few studies conclude voters
newspapers compared to NGOs or the judiciary than
respond as expected to information on corruption by
were more educated individuals. We speculate that this
punishing corrupt politicians (Ferraz and Finan 2008),
result is due to the fact that less educated respondents
other studies find that this response varies by class
were generally unfamiliar with NGOs and may not have
(Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013), is contingent on the
entirely positive feelings toward the judicial system. This
political party of the politician accused of corruption (de
result suggests that printed media with high standards of
Figuereido, Hidalgo, and Kasahara 2011; Muñoz,
journalism in Colombia carries a special weight in the
Anduiza, and Gallego 2012), on the level of corruption
evaluations of political candidates for important seg-
in a given country and the state of its economy (Klasnja
ments of the population—even if they may not read the
and Tucker 2013), or may even not be observed (Banerjee
newspaper itself.4
et al. 2010; Pereira, Melo, and Figueiredo 2009). Thus,
An interesting side note is that accusations of prior
there is little consensus on how voters respond to infor-
corruption cause respondents to deem candidates less
mation about corrupt politicians.
trustworthy but are not part of a voter’s calculation in
Pooling disparate results from experiments can be dif-
determining competence to hold office. This finding sup-
ficult. The experiments are necessarily conducted at dif-
ports one mechanism hypothesized by scholars arguing
ferent times in different elections across different
that voters trade off corruption for other issues (Rundquist,
countries. The possible explanations for the heteroge-
Strom, and Peters 1977), in this specific case, perceptions
neous findings are far more numerous than the number of
of administrative competence.
studies, and saying anything definitive is impossible.
This paper advances the understanding of the condi-
Some scholars have studied types of corruption (Johnston
tions under which citizens respond to information
1996; Rose-Ackerman 1999), and area specialists may
about corruption and provides empirical evidence of
focus on the differences across contexts, but it is also pos-
the role that specific sources can play in disseminating
sible that differences in the treatments provided account
this information. Increasing governmental transpar-
for some of the results. Although it is certainly possible
ency and providing voters with accurate information
that the flyers distributed by De la O et al. (2010) are
about politicians are a priority in both developing and
more effective than the campaign of meetings, posters,
developed countries. However, our findings suggest
and puppet shows employed by Banerjee et al. (2010), we
that transparency might not be enough to ensure demo-
focus instead on the cited source of the information about
cratic accountability. For information to be an “anti-
corruption accusations. In earlier experiments, the cor-
dote” against corruption (Winters, Testa, and ruption allegation has been attributed to federal govern-
Frederickson 2012), it has to come from sources voters
ment audits of municipalities (e.g., Ferraz and Finan
deem credible. This result sharpens our theoretical
2008), reports from the federal auditor (De La O et al.
understanding of how information about corruption
2010), a public prosecutor (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz
affects election outcomes and reinforces Lupia and
2013), a combination of judicial decisions and newspa-
McCubbins’ (1998, 75) call for creating institutions
pers (e.g., de Figuereido, Hidalgo, and Kasahara 2011),
that promote reasoned choices.
or not attributed to any source (e.g., Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro 2013).
Literature Review
An exception is a working paper by Weitz-Shapiro and
Winters (2014) that varied the source of corruption infor-
Even though voters tend to hold negative attitudes toward
mation in a survey experiment conducted in Brazil.
corruption, evidence of the electoral impunity of corrupt
Corruption accusations were...
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