Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance

AuthorAmy B. Monahan - Daniel Schwarcz
Positionrofessor and Solly Robbins Distinguished Research Fellow at the University of Minnesota Law School - Associate Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School
Pages1935-1989
  
1935
Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance
Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz
ABSTRACT: Health care reform devotes substantial attention to
resuscitating the small-group health insurance markets that serve employers
with fewer than fifty full-time employees. Nevertheless, a number of
interweaving provisions embedded within the Affordable Care Act create
strong incentives that, starting in 2014, will tend to undermine these
markets and, in the process, increase the fiscal cost of reform. First, small
employers with predominantly low-income employees will tend to opt out of
small-group markets. Second, small employers with mixed-income employees
will have strong incentives to offer coverage that is either technically not
“affordable” or that fails to provide “minimum value” in order to preserve
the availability of premium and cost-sharing subsidies on individual
markets for their low-income employees. Third, small employers with
unusually low-risk employees will have strong incentives to self-insure any
group plan they do offer in order to avoid cross-subsidizing higher-risk
groups. Analyzing these risks collectively, this Article offers a number of
recommendations for saving small-group markets. For instance, it argues
that the Small Employer (“SHOP”) exchanges that are intended to organize
small-group markets in 2014 must strategically target the weaknesses of self-
insurance by offering simple and risk-free coverage options that facilitate
employee choice. They must also market this coverage aggressively in
response to insurance brokers’ likely financial incentives to push self-
insurance on small employers. Additionally, state and federal regulators
should explore various possibilities for making small employers more likely to
offer group coverage through SHOP exchanges. To accomplish this, they
should consider regulating stop-loss insurance and preventing churning
between the self-insured and small-group markets.
Amy Monahan is a Professor and Solly Robbins Distinguished Research Fellow at the
University of Minnesota Law School and Daniel Schwarcz is an Associate Professor at the
University of Minnesota Law School. We are grateful to Mark Hall, Allison Hoffman, Timothy
Jost, and Bill Sage as well as to participants in workshops at Cornell Law School and UCLA Law
School for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. A condensed version of this
Article was published simultaneously as Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Limiting the ACA’s
Threats to Small Group Health Insurance Markets, 16 RISK MGMT & INS. REV. 25 (2013).
1936 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1935
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1938
I. THE ACA’S REFORM OF SMALL-GROUP MARKETS ............................... 1942
A. SMALL-GROUP MARKETS PRE-ACA ................................................. 1942
B. THE REGULATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL-GROUP MARKETS
POST-ACA ..................................................................................... 1945
1. The ACA’s Regulation of Individual and Small-Group
Markets .................................................................................. 1945
2. The ACA’s Subsidies and Taxes in Individual and Small-
Group Markets ...................................................................... 1947
II. SMALL EMPLOYERS AND THE DECISION TO OFFER GROUP COVERAGE
POST-ACA ............................................................................................ 1950
A. SMALL EMPLOYERS WITH PREDOMINANTLY LOW-INCOME
EMPLOYEES .................................................................................... 1951
B. SMALL EMPLOYERS WITH PREDOMINANTLY HIGH-INCOME
EMPLOYEES .................................................................................... 1956
C. MIXED-INCOME SMALL EMPLOYERS ................................................ 1958
D. THE IMPACT OF SMALL EMPLOYERS COVERAGE DECISIONS .............. 1963
III. SELF-INSURANCE AND SMALL-GROUP MARKETS POST-ACA ................. 1965
A. BACKGROUND ON SELF-INSURANCE .................................................. 1965
B. BENEFITS TO SMALL EMPLOYERS OF SELF-INSURING IN 2014 ............ 1967
1. General Advantages ............................................................. 1967
2. Self-Insurance as Part of the Affordability or Minimum-
Value Strategies .................................................................... 1968
3. A Hidden Benefit of Self-Insurance and the Minimum-
Value Strategy: Dumping High-Risk Employees ................ 1969
C. REDUCED RISKS OF SELF-INSURING IN 2014 ..................................... 1970
D. THE IMPACT OF SMALL EMPLOYERS DECISIONS TO SELF-INSURE ...... 1972
IV. SAVING SMALL-GROUP MARKETS ......................................................... 1975
A. REGULATE STOP-LOSS COVERAGE .................................................... 1975
B. DESIGNING SHOPS TO COMPETE AGAINST SELF-INSURANCE ............. 1978
1. Leverage Employee Choice ................................................. 1980
2. Leverage Limited Risk ......................................................... 1981
3. Leverage Simplicity .............................................................. 1982
4. A Cautionary Note on Defined-Contribution
Arrangements ....................................................................... 1983
C. BROKER INCENTIVES AND SELLING SHOPS OVER SELF-INSURANCE .... 1984
D. ADDITIONAL REGULATORY/LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR STATES ........ 1986
1. Limit Churning Between SHOP Exchanges and Self-
Insurance .............................................................................. 1986
2. Merge the Individual and Small-Group Markets ............... 1988
2013] SAVING SMALL-EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE 1937
3. Expand the Small-Group Market to 100 Full-Time
Employees in 2014 ............................................................... 1988
E. A NOTE ABOUT FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS .............................. 1989
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1989

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