Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil–Military Relations

• Author: Donald S. Travis
• Published date: 01 July 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16667287
• Date: 01 July 2017
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Saving Samuel

Huntington and the

Need for Pragmatic

Civil–Military Relations

Donald S. Travis

1

Abstract

How the U.S. military establishment interacts with other parts of the American gov-

ernment and the people impacts American national power. Because civil–military rela-

tionships are influenced by the context of the environment and the ‘‘kind of war’’ being

waged, there are a variety of ways that military and civilian leaders can work together to

improve the nation’s security. This article proposes an alternative civil–military relations

model called pragmatic civilian control. It integrates Samuel Huntington’s objective

civilian control theory with traditional American political philosophy and concepts

established by Morris Janowitz, while accounting for current geopolitical conditions.

Keywords

civil–military relations, public policy, military culture, democracy

Civil–military relation refers to the relationship between the armed forces of the state

and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how

the interface between them is ordered and regulated (Hooker, 2011, p. 1).

Americans remain concerned about the condition of American civil–military

relations and the theories that underpin this important subject (Eikenberry &

1

Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Donald S. Travis, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, Collins Hall, Room B113, 650

Wright Ave 89 E. Ridge St., Carlisle, PA 17013, USA.

Email: dontravis752@yahoo.com

Armed Forces & Society

2017, Vol. 43(3) 395-414

ªThe Author(s) 2016

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16667287

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Kennedy, 2013; Rapp, 2015). Such concerns might be related to dysfunctional

relationships between civilian and military leaders or institutions (Dubik, 2015b;

Fallows, 2015; Thompson, 2015). Even if it were true that the ongoin g tension

between politicians and soldiers ‘‘is really a conflict over the division of labor’’

(Feaver, 1996a, p. 177), such anxieties may signal a need for alternative ways to

describe or designate the relationship between civilians and the military, especially

since the United States continues to experience multiple and enduring conflicts.

Samuel Huntington’s concept of ‘‘objective civilian control’’ has been influential

among political and military leaders since it was first introduced in the late 1950s.

Yet, the United States faces new conditions that have brought about a variety of

unforeseen threats. Multiple types of conflicts are waged simultaneously by a large

and diverse defense establishment that multitasks and employs a variety of defense

capabilities. Indeed, critics suggest that civilian and military leaders remain overly

reliant on objective control theory as an operating principle of civil–military rela-

tions. If Huntington’s civil–military theories are not sufficient to effectively regulate

civil–military relationships, what kind of civil–military theory is needed to supple-

ment objective civilian control? What are some additional ways that the professional

military can interact with civilians to strengthen U.S. national security?

To meet the criticisms and questions, this essay introduces a ‘‘pragmatic’’

approach to civil–military relations that acknowledges the convergence of American

pragmatism, public administration theory, and national security requirements.

Recent research indicates that a pragmatic approach can be applied to military roles

and missions (Shields & Soeters, 2013a). Not only has pragmatism been exposed to

students of national security since the 1960 publication of Morris Janowitz’s book

The Professional Soldier, but it is being explored as a useful theoretical model to

improve the administration of national defense (Shields, 2011; Shields & Soeters,

2013b). Nevertheless, any new civil–military theory must not discount Huntington’s

objective control paradigm because its precepts are highly regarded. Under the

pragmatic ideal, striving to optimize civil–military relationships means that objec-

tive control theories will continue to operate and have practical applications for

certain conditions and operations.

This essay will first review Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control para-

digm. His theories will be revisited as segue to the next section. Then, a new civil–

military relations model—pragmatic civilian control—will be outlined. Finally,

some potential implications of the proposed pragmatic civil–military model will

be discussed.

Objective Civilian Control

Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control theor y emphasizes the military’s

‘‘functional imperative’’ to provide for national security without undermining the

democratic system of government. In the midst of the Cold War, it was believed that

growing American military power posed a challenge to traditional political ideals.

396 Armed Forces & Society 43(3)