Saving for Natural Disasters: Evidence From Pennsylvania Local Governments

Published date01 June 2023
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X221145920
AuthorTheodore Arapis,Vaswati Chatterjee
Date01 June 2023
Subject MatterOriginal Research General Interest Articles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X221145920
State and Local Government Review
2023, Vol. 55(2) 120 –138
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0160323X221145920
journals.sagepub.com/home/slg
Original Research General Interest Article
Introduction
In recent years, natural disasters have been on
the rise all around the globe. In the United States
alone between 2004 and 2013, there were 32%
more presidentially declared disasters, disasters
that exceeded state and local management capac-
ity, than in the previous decade (Government
Finance Officers Association [GFOA] 2015). As
natural disasters continue to increase in severity
and frequency, so does the cost of disaster relief
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC] 2021). In 2020 alone—a year when the
Atlantic had so many tropical storms that meteo-
rologists ran out of names, the Midwest saw its
crop yield flattened, and the West broke histori-
cal records for its wildfires—the cost to govern-
ment for natural disasters reached $22 billion,
$6 billion more than any other year on record
(Siders, Reily, and Niemeier 2020).
While the American disaster management
system appears generous with disaster relief
funding, it is also known for its “bottom-up”
approach and bureaucratic complexity (Lindsay
2012). Once a disaster occurs, local govern-
ments are the first ones to respond; depending on
1145920SLGXXX10.1177/0160323X221145920State and Local Government ReviewArapis and Chatterjee
research-article2022
1Villanova University, Department of Public Administration,
Villanova, PA, USA
2Villanova University, Department of Public Administration,
Villanova, PA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Theodore Arapis, Associate Professor of Public
Administration, Villanova University, Department of Public
Administration, Liberal Arts Room 268, Villanova, PA
19085-1603, USA.
Email: theodoros.arapis@villanova.edu
Saving for Natural Disasters:
Evidence From Pennsylvania
Local Governments
Theodore Arapis1 and Vaswati Chatterjee2
Abstract
For all governments—federal, state, or local—natural disasters impose significant costs. Among the
three, local governments typically respond first using their own resources. Thus, a proactive fiscal
mechanism providing resources for initiating disaster response (e.g., emergency debris removal,
medical services, rescue) appears necessary, especially for governments vulnerable to disasters.
This study explores the role of natural disasters on fiscal savings strategy using data collected by
Pennsylvania municipal executives via our Pandemic Management Survey. Following our findings,
Pennsylvania local governments appear to weigh both their experiences and preparedness level
to face a disaster. While more disaster experiences motivated fiscal savings accumulation, lower
savings were retained among prepared governments. As such, disaster learning and adaptation not
only could limit loss of life and property, but also lead to an efficient fiscal savings strategy.
Keywords
fiscal savings, rainy day funds, natural disasters, disaster relief.
Arapis and Chatterjee 121
the severity of the disaster, additional aid might
flow from higher levels of government (Chen
2020). Local governments, for instance, would
only receive federal assistance if the disaster was
presidentially declared (Federal Emergency
Management Agency [FEMA] 2003). Aid, then,
involves reimbursements of costs from FEMA
rather than immediate advancement of funds
(Hildreth 2009). State governments could also
assist their localities with disasters, but aid
would require in most cases legislative approval,
a process that could add significant delay to the
disaster response (National Conference of State
Legislatures [NCSL] 2021).
Evidently, disaster response involves com-
plex spending arrangements across all levels of
government. As a result, aid often arrives late
and is less than expected. Even with federally
declared disasters, neither the level nor the tim-
ing of reimbursements is guaranteed. New
Orleans, for instance, by the end of the first year
following the Katrina disaster, had received
only 39% of its requested reimbursement
(Hildreth 2009). When a disaster occurs, it is
local governments that act first, using their own
resources to pay for “overtime personnel, debris
removal, emergency medical services, facility
repair and replacement, and rescue and evacua-
tion actions” (Chen 2020, 26). A proactive fiscal
mechanism supporting such actions, therefore,
appears necessary for local governments, espe-
cially those most vulnerable to disasters. It is
important to note that while state and federal aid
can assist with long-term recovery functions
(e.g., rebuilding infrastructure, housing reloca-
tion for displaced populations, and economic
recovery), fiscal mechanisms at the local level
are essential for the efficient mobilization of
resources for immediate protective and response
actions to minimize loss of life and property as
extreme events are actually occurring.
Across local governments, among the most
common fiscal tools used to manage revenue
fluctuations, cover unplanned expenses, and con-
tinue service provision without disruption is fiscal
savings established in the fund balance; the unre-
stricted fund balance in particular (Arapis and
Reitano 2018; Gorina, Maher, and Park 2019;
Hendrick 2006; Wang and Hou 2012). In fact, the
GFOA (2015) has officially recommended that
general-purpose governments should maintain at
a minimum an unassigned fund balance in their
general fund of no less than 2 months of operating
revenues or expenditures. Depending on each
government’s circumstances (e.g., vulnerable to
disasters, dependency upon volatile or discretion-
ary revenues) a higher level could be desired
(GFOA 2015).
While disaster experience might also drive
decisions about fiscal savings (Gorina, Maher,
and Park 2019), due to data limitations, this
topic remains relatively unexplored. To the best
of our knowledge, existing studies exploring the
relationship between natural disasters and fiscal
savings focus exclusively on the state level. Lee
and Chen (2022), for instance, used organiza-
tional learning theory to test how experiences of
natural disasters shape state government fiscal
savings. The level of rainy day funds, their find-
ings suggest, raises as cumulative damage from
prior disasters increases. This relationship was
stronger in governments with high capacity to
build fiscal savings (Lee and Chen 2022). In an
earlier study, Pope and Leland (2019) showed
that state governments use rainy day funds not
only for smoothing cyclical fluctuation but also
in the aftermath of disasters. Politics also play a
role in the management of rainy day funds as in
states controlled by one party usage appeared
increased (Pope and Leland 2019). At the local
level, scholarship has focused exclusively on
the fiscal aftermath of major natural disasters,
specifically by assessing their impact on bud-
geting, spending patterns, and fiscal health.1
But what about their role on fiscal savings
strategy?
Our study advances the fiscal savings litera-
ture by adding new knowledge on the role of
natural disasters on fiscal savings strategy of
local governments. To do so, we use data from
our Pandemic Management Survey (PMS),
which we distributed across Pennsylvania
municipal executives (mayors, city and county
managers and administrators) in the spring of
2021 (February to March). This survey was
designed to assess, among other things, local
governments’ experiences with natural disasters
(e.g., floods, mud slides, sinkholes, extreme
weather events) within the past decade and their
preparedness levels to face future disasters.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT