Saving lives with force: an agenda for expanding the ACRI.

• Author: O'Hanlon, Michael E.
• Position: The Military Component

"The international community can and must do better. Rather than thinking in terms of a 5,000-person UN force, the international community should develop capacity to deploy at least 100,000 more troops abroad."

Several hundred thousand people continue to lose their lives each year due to the direct effects of civil conflict, war-related famine and disease. This number has not markedly increased since the end of the Cold War, nor has it declined.

These wars have an obvious and tragic toll in lost human lives--with most of the dead being innocent noncombatants. The wars have other costs as well: They provide terrorist groups with havens, as in Afghanistan throughout most of the last decade, and with motivating causes, as in many parts of the Middle East. They do much to keep large segments of Africa and certain other parts of the world mired in misery and economic stagnation. Moreover, these wars undercut the US argument that democracies truly protect and promote human rights. The world is essentially run and dominated by the industrial democracies, and their apparent indifference to many such conflicts weakens their moral authority and international legitimacy as global leaders.

What can be done to reduce the prevalence and severity of such wars? Traditional peacekeeping in Kashmir, Cyprus and the Sinai has a role. So does the more comprehensive approach--involving not only peacekeeping but also election monitoring, demilitarization and state building--that has been applied in places such as Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti and the Balkans. Despite many assertions to the contrary, most or all of these missions have achieved at least partial success in the sense that intervention probably made conditions better than they otherwise would have been. However, missions in Angola and Rwanda were outright and major failures, in that bloodshed intensified after the deployment of UN troops. Moreover, the world's failure to intervene in places such as the Sudan and Liberia means that the international community deserves no more than a low passing grade for its humanitarian military efforts in the first post-Cold War decade.

Traditional policy tools such as neutral peacekeeping, preventive action, economic aid and other softer approaches all have important roles, but they are insufficient by themselves. In some cases, wars are already underway, making it impractical to carry out preventive action or to provide much development assistance. In other cases, peacetime political and economic conditions are so poor that aid is wasted, misdirected or ineffectual. Neutral peacekeeping does not always work, either. Advocates of separating militias and disarming combatants must realize that in many, if not most, cases, militias and combatants will not wish to be separated or disarmed--and would not assent to such operations if asked. Their weapons provide routes to power and wealth, and antagonists often have no interest in giving them up or in disengaging from combat operations.

If the global community needs more capacity for humanitarian intervention, should that job be given to the United Nations? Some would say yes. For example, it is commonly argued that a small UN standing force could make a meaningful difference in reducing civil conflict around the world. Proponents often cite a goal of 5,000 troops, motivated in large part by the claim of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire that such a capability, if added to his small UN force in Rwanda in 1994, could have stopped the genocide there. However, Rwanda is a small country that is not representative of many of the places where civil conflict erupts. Although there is little doubt that General Dallaire would have used 5,000 more troops bravely and with some effectiveness, it appears a low estimate even for Rwanda. Had such forces run into trouble, the international community would have needed to bail them out. In the event of two or more simultaneous conflicts requiring rapid attention, such a force would clearly be far too small.

The international community can and must do better. Rather than thinking in terms of a 5,000-person UN force, the international community should develop capacity to deploy at least 100,000 more troops abroad. Standing up a dedicated UN force of this size would be very expensive, not to mention politically contentious. Fortunately, such a move is unnecessary. National armies around the world are already available, with many of their costs paid by their home governments. Building on this existing capability, rather than creating a new one from scratch, is surely a more efficient way to use resources. To do so, Washington needs to provide political encouragement--and to accept a greater global security role for the European Union, Japan and other countries. In the case of poorer countries, notably many in Africa, the United States and its friends and allies should provide aid and technical assistance to national military establishments.

The main US program for training militaries in Africa, known as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), can play a meaningful role in this endeavor. This would be especially true if the ACRI were expanded to cover...