Sarah L. Thomas, a Legislative Challenge: a Proposed Model Statute to Provide for the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings for Indigent Petitioners

• Citation: Vol. 54 No. 2
• Publication year: 2005

A LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGE: A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE TO PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIGENT PETITIONERS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1140

I. THE CURRENT LACK OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS VERSUS THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROCEEDING ................................................... 1143

A. U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence .......................................... 1143

B. States That Judicially Mandate the Right to Counsel for

Habeas Petitioners ................................................................... 1145

1. The Mississippi Example .................................................... 1145

2. States That Impose Right Through Court Rule ................... 1146

II. THE HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS REVEALS THE NECESSITY FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIGENT PETITIONERS ...................................... 1147

A. U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence .......................................... 1148

B. Federal Statutory Right to Habeas Corpus .............................. 1149

III. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPES IN THE STATES ...................... 1152

A. Trial Court Maintains Discretion To Appoint Counsel ............ 1153

B. States That Provide an Absolute Right to Counsel ................... 1155

C. States That Provide Counsel Only for Capital Habeas

Petitioners ................................................................................ 1155

D. States That Provide a Conditional Right to Counsel ................ 1157

IV. STATE LEGISLATIVE MODELS AND CRITIQUES FOR THE PROVISION

OF COUNSEL IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS .............................. 1158

A. An Absolute Statutory Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus

Proceedings .............................................................................. 1158

B. A Conditional Statutory Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus

Proceedings .............................................................................. 1159

1. A Conditional Right to Counsel Based on the Type of

Punishment ......................................................................... 1159

2. A Conditional Right to Counsel Based on the Nature of the Claim ............................................................................ 1160

a. The Statute Creates the Standards for Appointment .... 1160

b. The Judicial Branch Maintains Discretion To

Determine Whether Counsel Should Be Appointed ...... 1161

c. The State Public Defense Board Determines Whether

Counsel Should Be Appointed ...................................... 1162

V. THE SOLUTION: AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY DETERMINES

WHETHER COUNSEL SHOULD BE APPOINTED .................................. 1165

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 1167

APPENDIX A: STATES AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN HABEAS CORPUS

PROCEEDINGS .............................................................................................. 1169

APPENDIX B: A MODEL STATUTE ................................................................ 1181

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court and most state supreme courts¹do not require that counsel be provided as a matter of constitutional right to indigent petitioners in habeas corpus²cases. Most courts have rejected a constitutional right to counsel because of the belief that the writ of habeas corpus is technically a civil matter.³However, a writ of habeas corpus is a major remedy for prisoners, and it may be the first time some prisoners are able to raise legitimate claims.⁴The state of Mississippi exemplifies the one exception to judicial hesitation to extend the right of counsel to the habeas corpus context.⁵

The Mississippi Supreme Court held that assistance of counsel for capital postconviction petitioners is a constitutional right.⁶

Constitutional rights and fundamental values are implemented by institutions other than courts. Thirty-two states have created a statutory right to counsel in habeas corpus cases.⁷Other states have passed statutes giving courts the discretion to appoint counsel.⁸This Comment analyzes the legislative efforts to provide counsel for petitioners in habeas corpus cases.⁹

Looking to the courts to implement a right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings is misguided.¹⁰

This Comment argues that because habeas corpus is in essence a quasi- criminal proceeding, counsel should be provided as in other criminal proceedings. Though courts may not believe that they are bound by a constitutional mandate to appoint counsel for habeas corpus petitioners, legislatures also swear to uphold the Constitution and should honor the constitutional text and spirit through the creation of statutory rights which reflect constitutional principles.

Part I explains the general unwillingness of courts to mandate the appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases. Part I.A clarifies the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. Part I.B provides a brief account of the Mississippi Supreme Court as the lone state supreme court to articulate a right to counsel for habeas corpus petitioners, highlighting the contrast between the judicial remedy and the legislative remedy. This Section also shows how three states' judiciaries implemented the right to counsel for habeas petitioners through their inherent power to draft court rules.

Part II explains the aspects and history of the writ of habeas corpus, which illuminate the need for the appointment of counsel to indigent petitioners. The history of habeas corpus contrasts greatly with the judicial hesitancy to mandate appointment of counsel in such cases; but more importantly, it emphasizes the urgent need for legislatures to take action. Part II.A provides the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the writ of habeas corpus. Part II.B provides a brief overview of the federal statutory right to counsel. Part II concludes with the example of the Dr. Sam Sheppard case of the 1950s, which exemplifies the historic importance of the writ and the necessity for the assistance of counsel in modern times.

Part III provides a description of the current legislative landscape in the states regarding the appointment of counsel for indigent habeas petitioners. This Part highlights how different states have wrestled with the issue of the appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases and how different states have reached different conclusions regarding the scope of the right to counsel. Part III.A describes the default position in which trial courts maintain the discretion to appoint counsel for habeas corpus petitioners. This section concludes with an examination of judicial review of such discretionary decisions. Part III.B highlights those states which have mandated an absolute right to counsel for all habeas corpus petitioners. Part III.C describes those states that only mandate the appointment of counsel for capital habeas corpus petitioners. Part III.D briefly surveys those states that only provide a conditional right of counsel for habeas corpus petitioners.

Part IV provides state legislative models-and critiques of those models- for implementing a right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. While some state models include an absolute right to counsel, others only provide a conditional right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. Part IV.A explains the absolute right model while Part IV.B explains the condtional right model. The conditional right to counsel model has two approaches. Part IV.B.1 describes the first approach, which is based upon the type of punishment the habeas corpus petitioner faces. Part IV.B.2 describes the other approach, which is based upon the type of claim the habeas corpus petitioner presents. Part IV.B.2.a describes a model whereby the state legislature determines through its statutory delineations whether counsel should be appointed for the habeas corpus petitioner. Part IV.B.2.b provides a model where the statute leaves the decision to the discretion of the trial judge. Finally, Part IV.B.2.c provides a model of a statute which gives discretion to the state public defense board of whether to appoint counsel for the habeas corpus petitioner.

Finally, Part V proposes a solution for a better legislative approach to implementing a right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. Appendix A is a chart describing the right to counsel for habeas corpus petitioners in the fifty states. Appendix B proposes a model statute for legislatures to consider in adopting a right to counsel for indigent habeas corpus petitioners.

I. THE CURRENT LACK OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS VERSUS THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROCEEDING

A. U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence

The text of the U.S. Constitution provides for a writ of habeas corpus: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."¹¹

Congress has implemented the right to a writ of habeas corpus by statute.¹²All states provide similar constitutional guarantees to the writ of habeas corpus in their state constitutions.¹³Thus, courts in both the federal and state system provide habeas corpus review.

Despite the explicit constitutional foundation for habeas corpus, there is no federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings.¹⁴The U.S. Supreme Court considers habeas corpus a civil proceeding, not a criminal proceeding.¹⁵The Sixth Amendment right to counsel only applies in criminal proceedings and does not apply in civil proceedings.¹⁶As such, there exists no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case.¹⁷

Refusing to acknowledge the quasi-criminal nature of the habeas corpus proceeding, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that...