Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

• Published date: 01 April 2022
• DOI: 10.1177/00220027211042681
• Author: Tyler Kustra
• Date: 01 April 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

2022, Vol. 66(3) 443 –472

Sanctioning the Homeland:

Diasporas’ Influence

on American Economic

Sanctions Policy

Tyler Kustra

1

Abstract

Why do some immigrant groups succeed in influencing the U.S. government to

impose economic sanctions on their former dictators, while others do not? This

paper begins by noting that the president is the pivotal player in sanctions policy and

that presidents cater to voters in swing states. Therefore, a diaspora’s proportion of

the swing-state electorate should determine whether the American government

imposes sanctions on their former homeland. Considering dictatorships from 1946

to 2005, this paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the diaspora’s

proportion of the swing-state electorate increases the probability of regime-change

sanctions by 11 percentage points. It then calculates causal estimates of the effec-

tiveness of these sanctions on regime change. Using the diaspora’s proportion of the

swing-state electorate as an instrumental variable for the presence of economic

sanctions, it finds that sanctions do not have a positive, statistically-significant impact

on regime change while a negative impact is plausible.

Keywords

diaspora, economic sanctions, foreign policy, president, regime change, swing states

1

Independent Researcher.

Corresponding Author:

Tyler Kustra, Independent Researcher.

Email: tylerkustra@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027211042681

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Article

444 Journal of Conflict Resolution 66(3)

Introduction

How do the desires of disaporas combine with the ambitions of presidential candi-

dates to form American economic sanctions policy? This paper develops a theory of

immigrant groups’ influence on American sanctions policy and then tests it statis-

tically. It begins with three observations: i) diasporas from dictatorships despise their

former despots and want the American government to sanction them; ii) the pres-

ident has the power to unilaterally impose and revoke sanctions; and, iii) the pres-

ident caters to swing-state voters. As a result, a diaspora’s power to punish their

former rulers with American sanctions runs through the White House and is deter-

mined by the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate. Diasporas that are

powerful voting blocks in swing states will be able to affect American sanctions

policy; those that are not electorally powerful will not.

Using data from the decennial census and presidential-election returns, this paper

then provides a cross-country quantitative test of the effect of diasporas on foreign-

policy making. Considering economic sanctions imposed from 1946 to 2005 by the

United States to cause regime change, it finds that a one-percentage-point increase in

a diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate increases the proba bility of

sanctions on that diaspora’s homel and by 11 percentage points,

1

supporting the

theory.

Sanctions can be costly, so the United States government may be more likely to

impose sanctions in cases where they will be successful, biasing statistical analysis

in favor of finding that sanct ions are effective. Convers ely, presidents may use

sanctions as their first choice to solve a problem since they “often conclude that

the most obvious alternatives to economic sanctions would be unsatisfactory: Mil-

itary action would be too massive and diplomatic protest too meager. Sanctions can

provide a satisfying theatrical display yet avoid the high costs of war” (Hufbauer

et al. 2007, 7). Further, if targeted governments believe that resistance is futile, they

will be more likely to capitulate before sanctions are imposed in order to avoid

pointless damage. Both of these factors would bias the results against finding that

sanctions are effective. As a result of these competing biases, previous estimates of

the effectiveness of economic sanctions are unreliable and even whether they under-

estimate or overestimate sanctions’ true effect is unknown.

This paper provides a test of these sanctions’ effectiveness that overcomes these

concerns. It overcomes selection bias caused by the target capitulating by consid-

ering economic sanctions whose goal is regime change, since in these cases the

sanctioned leader will have no incentive to surrender. It overcomes selection bias

caused by the sender choosing to impose sanctions based on their probability of

success by leveraging the statistical analysis presented above and using the dia-

spora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate as an instrumental variable. It finds

that these sanctions do not have a positive, statistically-significant effect on regime

change and that any positive eff ect of sanctions on regime chang e greater than

12 percentage points can be rejected at the 10 percent significance level.

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It also

2Journal of Conflict Resolution XX(X)