Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daB Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschlieBlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit.

• Author: Krasser, Helmut

At the end of the first chapter of his Pramanaviniscaya (ed. T. Vetter [Vienna, 1966]; abbr. Pvin I), Dharmakirti formulates two proofs in order to establish that an object of cognition and its cognition are not different from each other. He deduces their being not different from each other, on the one hand, from the fact that they are necessarily perceived together (Pvin I 94, 18f. = v. 55ab) and, on the other hand, from the fact that consciousness of an object essentially is consciousness (PVin I 98, 7f.). The first of these proofs, the subject of Iwata's investigation, runs as follows: sahopalambhaniyamad abhedo nilatad-dhiyoh [vertical bar] (v. 55ab) ... dvicandradivat (PVin I 94, 18-23) = Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together ... like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a timira eye disease)." From this Dharmakirti draws the conclusion that any cognition bears two aspects, one subjective (grahaka) and one objective (grahya). From the cognition's bearing two aspects, moreover, he infers the self-consciousness (svasamvedana) of each cognition, which serves as the effect of a means of valid cognition (pramaliaphala). This theory applies, according to Dharmakirti, to the doctrine of the Sautrantikas, who assume an external object to be existent, as well as to the teaching of the Yogacaras, who do not accept such an idea. Thus, this theory plays an important role in Dharmakirti's epistemology and it was for this reason that in the following period it became a subject of dispute among Buddhists themselves, as well as between the Buddhists and philosophers belonging to other schools.

Iwata in this comprehensive work - the first volume consists in a study of the topic under consideration, the second includes the notes - treats all the essential problems connected with this proof. Besides the function of the sahopalambhaniyama proof in Dharmakirti's theory of knowledge and a historical survey of the idea, he discusses the structure and the development, from the sahopalambhaniyama, of this inference of the non-difference (abheda) between a cognition and its object. He deals with the various opinions regarding the elements of the proof such as sadhyadharmin, sadhyadharma, hetu or drstanta, as well as those regarding the meaning of its words, such as saha or niyama. The questions of vyapti and pakyadharmata are considered as well. In doing so, he translates and shows the...