Russian Rerun?

• Author: Ellis, Gail
• Position: Election interference

IF RUSSIA'S INTERFERENCE in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was a challenge, it is set to become even more brazen and sophisticated in this year's election. Could international law be used to mitigate the threat of election interference? "While there isn't a silver bullet solution that can fully address and prevent election interference in the digital era, some portions of U.S. and international law may offer some relief," says Ido Kilovaty, the inaugural Zedalis Family Fund Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa.

A specialist in cybersecurity law, cybercrime, and international law and cyberspace, Kilovaty teaches courses in cybersecurity law and policy, computer crime law, international law, and technology law--and has published extensively in these areas. "Ido Kilovaty is one of the mostexciting voices in the country on cyberlaw," says Oona Hathaway, the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale University. "His combination of technical know-how, creative vision, and deep understanding of the law allows him to see things that others miss. He is writing up a storm and, in the process, helping to create and shape a new field of cybersecurity law."

At present, Kilovaty is studying how U.S. law could adapt to the increasing volume of availability attacks, such as distributed denial-ofservice and ransomware; how private tech companies are setting the agenda for international cybersecurity norms; and the ways human rights law applies to extraterritorial statesponsored activities. This last topic directly pertains to the threat of Russian interference in U.S. elections.

International law prohibits states from coercively interfering in each other's domestic affairs, whether social, political, or economic. This often is referred to as "nonintervention." Any election interference that reaches a certain level of magnitude and coercion therefore would be in violation of international law. However, Kilovaty's research has found that the application of this longstanding norm is not as straightforward as it might seem.

"While cases where one state tells another state, 'Do X, or else,' may offer a clear-cut example of prohibited intervention, the use of political bots, disinformation, and distribution of sensitive documents may not necessarily reach the requisite level of 'coercion' required by nonintervention. This really calls us to reconsider what nonintervention ought to mean in the digital era, where acts of...