Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis.

• Author: Ismael, Tareq Y.

RUSSIAN (BETWEEN 1917-1991 SOVIET)-Iraqi relations have been generally part and parcel of their relations with the Third World countries and their national liberation movements, particularly Arab nationalism, which for both historical and geostrategic reasons has been especially important for Moscow. However, at the same time, particularly between 1958 and 1990, Soviet-Iraqi relations were marked by some special features, putting them in contrast with Soviet links with other Afro-Asian nations and even some states of the Arab Middle East.

(1) Iraq was first of all the nearest of all Arab countries to the Soviet borders and because of that proximity the threat of Soviet expansion could have been seen as being much more real by its leaders than by the leaders of the other Arab states. (1)

(2) Different from the other Arab states of al-Mashreq, Iraq, since its very beginning in the 1920s, contained a very substantial (close to 25%) ethnic non-Arab Kurdish minority with specific constitutional rights, which were granted in 1925 as a condition for the incorporation of the largely Kurdish populated Mosul region into its borders. (2) The Kurdish people, other groups of which live in Turkey, Iran and Russia, have never completely submitted to their division and lack of national self-determination, and in Iraq since 1961 have constantly demanded territorial autonomy. Their aspirations towards which the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent, were, however, putting it in the awkward situation of having to make a choice between their recognition and its general support of Arab nationalism and the friendly Iraqi government.

(3) The Iraqi Communist Party, which was formally founded in 1934, was one of the most effective and socially influential Marxist organizations in the region. Although it was never strong enough to take power by itself, it nevertheless represented a by no means negligible political force in the country, being for Moscow after 1958, both a valuable asset and an embarrassment in its deals with the "progressive" but still often viciously anti-communist Iraqi government.

(4) Last but not least, Iraq's economic potential and relative wealth, especially after the 1973 October War and the subsequent rise of the oil prices, made this country a financially attractive partner and customer for Moscow. These economic aspects, which had never been absent in the past, have acquired additional importance since the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of Russia as a separate and pro-capitalist nation.

Post-Soviet Russia, rejecting Marxist ideology and the ideological support of the Communist parties and the national liberation movements of the Third World peoples, is nevertheless still interested in cooperation with Iraq, and since 1994 has been supporting Baghdad politically against the U.S.imposed punitive sanctions. As the authors want to show, the history, geopolitics and economics at both regional and global levels were inextricably interwoven in the process of shaping its attitudes and foreign policy decisions. Although the main focus of the paper is Post-Soviet Russia after December 1991, the Soviet background needs to be taken into account and analyzed in order to find the elements of continuity and change in the present policy.

SOVIEY BACKGROUND

Russian (Soviet) relations with Iraq have a relatively long and complex history. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established for the first time on 9 September 1944 at the end of World War II. (3) The monarchic regime in Baghdad was nevertheless staunchly anti-communist and established its links with Moscow only because of its dependence on Britain and the British-Soviet alliance during the war. In January 1955 relations were broken off after the Soviets criticized the Iraqi government's decision to join the Baghdad Pact. (4)

When the pro-western monarchy was overthrown by a military coup on 14 July 1958, the new leader of the country, General Abd-al-Karim Quasim immediately re-established diplomatic ties with Moscow and started to buy Soviet arms. (5) Since then, for about forty years until the Gorbachev Perestroika in the late 1980s, Soviet-Iraqi cooperation was both close and multi-faceted, and for most of the period it was even officially called a "strategic partnership". However, this did not mean that during all that time their mutual relations had always been equally friendly and without serious political differences. As an American scholar indicated, because of their support of the national-liberation movements, a number of important Third World countries, including Iraq, "declared their friendship for and improved relations with the USSR and sided with it on a number of international problems". In no instance, however, did their leaders "compromise their own national interests or become Soviet stooges." (6) Baghdad's inte rest in cooperation with Moscow "was based on the need for a powerful patron in its efforts to shed all the remnants of Western colonialism and to establish Iraq as an autonomous member of the world order of nation states." (7) At the same time, however, the Iraqi "ruling elite had shown stubborn resistance towards anything which could be regarded as an intrusion into the country's internal affairs or as an infringement upon Iraq's sovereignty over its international policies." (8)

On 8 February 1963 Quasim's regime was overthrown and the Baath party came to power in Baghdad. Its persecution of the Iraqi Communist party and what the Soviet Union then described as its "policy of genocide towards the Kurds" (9) caused a sharp deterioration in Soviet-Iraqi relations. However, relations improved again after the new military coup on 18 November 1963 and during the ensuing Arif Brothers' rule up to July 1968. The visit by Iraqi Prime Minister Abd-al-Rahman al-Bazzaz to Moscow in July-August 1966 was a "milestone in the process of improving Soviet-Iraqi relations." (10) The Soviet Union welcomed the Iraqi government's statement of 29 June 1966 on the recognition of Kurdish national and linguistic rights, and in July 1967 Iraqi President Abd-al Rahman Arif, together with President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria went to Moscow as representatives of the Cairo Arab summit conference after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. (11) The friendly relations and further cooperation in military, economic and p olitical spheres continued and even increased after the Baath party's return to power on 17 July 1968. In retrospect, the 1968-1975 period could be seen as "the high tide of Soviet influence in Iraq." (12) Its culmination was the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the Iraqi Republic signed on 9 April 1972. The Treaty, which was concluded as a result of Iraqi initiative, (13) stressed the need for "concerted action in the international field to ensure world peace and security and to develop political cooperation between Iraq and the USSR" (art. 7) (14) Both parties also declared that "it will not enter into any international alliance or grouping or take part in any actions or undertakings directed against the other" (art. 10). (15) However, the treaty did not include any direct military obligations and stopped short of a real military alliance.

The late 1970s and 1980s brought some cooling of mutual relations and a weakening of cooperation. Iraq's growing financial resources after the rise in oil prices in 1973 created the basis for its widening links with the West and the ratio of the Soviet and Eastern European participation in the country's economic boom steadily declined. As a political outcome of that, some of the differences between the parties "resurfaced, producing visible strains in the 'strategic alliance' between Moscow and Baghdad." (16) In the late 1970s, the differences on issues such as the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli dispute, where Iraq was questioning Soviet recognition of the State of Israel in the pre-1967 War borders, Iraq's treatment of the I.C.P., the Kurdish national movement and Soviet support for Ethiopia against Somalia and Eritrea further deteriorated after the Iranian revolution and even more so with the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. On 6 January 1980, Saddam Hussein called the So viet intervention "unjustifiable, erroneous behavior that could cause anxiety for all freedom-loving and independent peoples," (17) and Iraq voted for the resolutions condemning Soviet intervention both in the U.N. General Assembly and the Islamabad (Pakistan) Conference of the Islamic States. (18) When on 22 September 1980 Iraq attacked Iran, starting a war which was going to last for almost eight years and which proved to be devastating to both countries, the USSR did not outwardly condemn Iraq's aggression, but immediately stopped its direct military supply to it and adopted a neutral stand. (19) At all stages of the conflict the Soviet leaders described it as "tragically senseless" and directed against "the fundamental national interests of both countries." (20) In a speech on 30 September 1980, Brezhnev called both the states of Iraq and Iran "friendly to the USSR" and stressed that "We are in favor of Iran and Iraq settling their outstanding problems at the negotiating table." (21) From the Soviet point of view, the situation when the two "anti-imperialist regimes . . . were cutting each other's throats" (22) was truly deplorable. In the summer of 1982 war started to be fought on Iraqi territory and on 10 June 1982 Iraq promised to withdraw to the international border, Moscow then renewed the arms supply to Baghdad (23), but it nevertheless still supported all the attempts at mediation among the belligerents. (24) Its balanced and cautious policy resulted in a marked improvement in its relations with Iran, which would be of particular importance for the future. (25)

Despite all these tensions and even serious political disagreements, Soviet-Iraqi...