Russia plays the China card.

AuthorMarsh, Christopher
PositionRising & Resurgent Powers - Essay

THE FRICTION between China and the Soviet Union that began to mount in the spring of 1969 along the Sino-Soviet border signaled to Washington that the communist world was not monolithic. Indeed, despite their seemingly common ideological commitments, relations between the two communist giants were deteriorating to the point of confrontation. In this environment, the Nixon Administration began to make gestures toward China to improve bilateral relations. Henry Kissinger believed that "the hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other." In this way, the United States got the Russians to the negotiating table, pushed through the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and ushered in an era of detente with the USSR.

Thirty years later, as tensions between Washington and Moscow heat up, Russia may be playing its own China card. At a meeting of foreign experts and journalists last fall, Russian President Vladimir Putin pointed out that "Russia's relations with Beijing have reached a historic level." His comments occurred against the backdrop of a two-year set of cultural exchanges, the "year of Russia" in China followed by the "year of China" in Russia. The promotion of this event is taken so seriously in Russia that its organizing committee is chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, Putin's close confidant and possible successor. It was under the aegis of this "cultural" event that Chinese President Hu Jintao staged his March trip to the Kremlin, where he expressed admiration for Russia's contributions to world civilization, referring to China's "strategic partnership" with Russia every few sentences. Hu's speech also included praise for Russia's military achievements, and it was clearly designed to pay respect to the senior partner in the relationship. While China recognizes that Russia's power and stature have drastically declined, China--in its dealings with the Kremlin--continues to give Russia the status it craves and demands as a great power and former superpower.

Peter Berger once remarked, "sometimes eating a hamburger is simply just that--eating a hamburger", with no deeper significance implied. But does waiting in line for hours to eat solyanka, dine on chicken Kiev, drink Baltika beer and watch performances by Russian dance troupes dressed in Soviet-era military uniforms imply some deeper nostalgia among Chinese for the heady days of the 1950s Sino-Soviet partnership, when the two countries were aligned against the United States? Is it confirmation of what Steven Weber and his co-authors describe as the desire to build a new world order "without the West?" (1)

These and other developments in the Sino-Russian relationship may be more than simply cultural events or empty diplomatic maneuvers. Bilateral relations between powers do not take place in a vacuum. And changes in both the U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relationships have a direct impact on how Moscow and Beijing evaluate the Sino-Russian connection.

THE U.S.-Russia post-Cold War marriage is over, and relations between the two have developed a new chill. Meanwhile, U.S.-China relations remain complicated by the expansion of China's military, U.S. military operations across the globe and the future status of Taiwan. In such a climate, China and Russia are warming up to each other in ways seldom seen before.

Traditionally, Sino-Russian relations have been based on the need for mutual coexistence, the necessity to protect one's rear flank and the threat of other states' ambitions on the Eurasian landmass. But now Russia and China also look to the other as a way to balance against the United States.

Some voices in both countries are now calling for a Russia-China alliance. While there...

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