A run for the money: spin-offs, rivals and UN reform.

• Author: Wedgwood, Ruth

IN THE fading light of Kofi Annan's tenure as a "reform" secretary general, super sleuth Paul Volcker has made plain that Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athi regime plundered the Oil for Food program. Oil for Food was touted as a humanitarian benefice, entrusted to the United Nations. But an inquiry headed by Volcker, the former Federal Reserve Board chairman, has shown without a doubt that Saddam shaped the program to deliver kickbacks and surcharges, converting coercive economic sanctions into a global ATM. The UN also gained a tempting "administrative" surcharge from Saddam's oil sales, and no one inside Turtle Bay was willing to blow the whistle on a program gone haywire. Volcker and his colleagues have called for the reform of UN practices to prevent similar mismanagement.

But conservatives and liberals alike must recognize that internal reform is unlikely. Senator Norm Coleman can seek dues-withholdings. State and federal grand juries may add some froth and frisson to the usual conversations in the staff cafeteria. A tough-minded U.S. ambassador can make an impression on the 38th floor.

Unfortunately, key internal changes are likely to succumb to the doldrums of the General Assembly. Many of the changes needed at the United Nations lie within the decisional power of the General Assembly, which has no obvious incentive to change its own shared perquisites. Votes in the General Assembly oft-times are predetermined before they get there. Ambassador Richard Schifter has noted that during the Cold War the Soviet Union would approach selected members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and ask them to serve as caucus whips on issues of interest in the East-West confrontation. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Cuba has continued to play a similar role in both the General Assembly in New York and the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. (Collectors of political trivia will be pleased to know that the reputed Cuban author of the UN's infamous "Zionism is Racism" resolution was recently spotted in Geneva, where he now serves as an "expert" for the UN Subcommission on Human Rights.) The United States cannot attend the NAM and G-77 meetings, and the rule of consensus usually means the most intense advocates carry the day. Even states friendly to the United States may be unwilling to break consensus on key points, lest they lose caucus support on other issues they do care about. Faced with competing priorities, Washington is often unable to nail down the necessary commitments from foreign capitals. And in the carnival mood of the General Assembly, some country delegations don't even bother to call home about impending votes, or they ignore their instructions. It takes a concerted diplomatic effort to master a moving game, with 190 other players on the board, and we often do not invest the time. This makes the General Assembly a daunting place to seek reform measures. (Of course, some wits may say that reform of other institutions can be equally daunting; one-third of a college faculty can yield a dead-hand tiller.)

Within days of Volcker's final report on Oil for Food mismanagement, a UN "Millennium Summit" was staged in New York, marking the organization's sixtieth anniversary. (Like Buckingham Palace, the UN is often best at purely ceremonial events.) The summit declaration of 171 heads of state endorsed some mild "good governance" proposals--confiding that the General Assembly should review outmoded programs, establish a more competitive personnel system, and support a toothier inspector general and external advisory group to review audit procedures. But even these are likely to wind up on the cutting room floor. Many countries of the south and elsewhere lack enthusiasm for the organizational aims put forward by the United States, and an ineffective organization is seen as a small price to pay for retaining a veto by inefficiency.

In Kofi Annan's first term as secretary general, the General Assembly ignored the cogent recommendations for peacekeeping reform offered by Algerian envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. Earlier, the reform proposals of former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh--serving as a UN undersecretary for management--had the honor of being shredded under orders from former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. (Volcker alleges, incidentally, that Iraqi oil vouchers awarded by Saddam found their way to a joint venture owned by the brother-in-law and the...