Rule 606 COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness

(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.

(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jurors' attention, (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.

Source: Entire rule amended and effective and committee comment added and effective September 27, 2007.

COMMITTEE COMMENT

Rule 606(b) has been amended to bring it into conformity with the 2006 amendments to the federal rule, providing that juror testimony may be used to prove that the verdict reported was the result of a mistake in entering the verdict on the verdict form. The federal amendment responded to a divergence between the text of the Rule and the case law that had established an exception for proof of clerical errors. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee notes (2006 Amendments); see also Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2002).

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Rule 606(b): Competency of Jurors as Witnesses", see 25 Colo. Law. 47 (Mar. 1996). For article, "Admissibility of Juror Affidavits Under C.R.E. 606(b)", see 32 Colo. Law. 61 (Mar. 2003). For article, "People v. Harlan: The Colorado Supreme Court Takes a Step Toward Eliminating Religious Influence on Juries", see 83 Den. U.L. Rev. 613 (2005). For article, "Uncovering Juror Racial Bias", see 96 Denv. L. Rev. 309 (2019).

Where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the sixth amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 855, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017).

Not every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry. For the inquiry to proceed, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict. Whether that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 855, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017).

Purpose of this rule is to reinforce the finality of jury verdicts, to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations, and to safeguard the privacy of jurors; however, in cases where result of jury deliberations are substantially undermined due to fundamental flaws in deliberation process, courts must weigh these policies against overriding concern that parties to judicial process be assured of fair result. Ravin v. Gambrell by and through Eddy, 788 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1990).

Section (b) has three fundamental purposes: To promote finality of verdicts, shield verdicts from impeachment, and protect jurors from harassment and coercion. Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2002).

Section (b) allows juror testimony on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jurors' attention. People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005).

The common law in Colorado supports a plain meaning application of section (b) and its two stated exceptions. Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2002).

Section (b) precludes the use of jurors' post-verdict statements to the court to impeach the unanimous verdict. Granting of new trial based upon jurors' statements improper even if statements made prior to the jury being disbursed. Hall v. Levine, 104 P.3d 222 (Colo. 2005).

This rule contains no exception for clerical error. Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2002).

The Colorado supreme court amended section (b) in 2007 to add an exception for a mistake in entering a verdict on the verdict form. Malpica-Cue v. Fangmeier, 2017 COA 46, 395 P.3d 1234.

The mistake exception in section (b) is narrow and limited to cases in which the verdict rendered is not the verdict to which the jury agreed. Malpica-Cue v. Fangmeier, 2017 COA 46, 395 P.3d 1234.

An exception to the rule that a trial court cannot reconvene a discharged jury applies when the jury has not yet dispersed, there is no evidence that the jury has been subjected to outside influences from the time of the initial discharge to the time of re-empanelment, and the jury remains under the de facto control of the court. It was appropriate to modify a judgment that relied on an ambiguous verdict form...