Rule 24 INTERVENTION.

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

Rule 24. Intervention.

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.

Cross references: For service and filing of pleadings and other papers, see C.R.C.P. 5.

ANNOTATION

I. General Consideration.

II. Intervention of Right.

III. Permissive Intervention.

IV. Procedure.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "Notes on Proposed Amendments to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure", see 27 Dicta 165 (1950). For article, "Amendments to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure", see 28 Dicta 242 (1951). For article, "Pleadings, Rules 7 to 25", see 28 Dicta 368 (1951). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 37 Dicta 21 (1960). For note, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J., 67 (1964).

This rule is a duplicate of the same numbered federal rule. Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963).

It must be liberally construed to avoid a multiplicity of suits, so that all related controversies should as far as possible be settled in one action. Senne v. Conley, 110 Colo. 270, 133 P.2d 381 (1943); Tekai Corp. v. Transamenca Title Ins. Co., 39 Colo. App. 528, 571 P.2d 321 (1977).

The rules of intervention are to be liberally construed so that all related controversies may be settled in one action. City of Delta v. Thompson, 37 Colo. App. 205, 548 P.2d 1292 (1975); Great Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2001).

The legal concept of intervention is based upon the natural right of a litigant to protect himself from the consequences of an action against one in whose cause he has an interest, or by the result of which he may be bound. Grijalva v. Elkins, 132 Colo. 315, 287 P.2d 970 (1955); Mauro ex rel. Mauro v. State Farm Mut., 2013 COA 117, 410 P.3d 495.

An existing or pending suit is prerequisite to intervention. Saunders v. Bankston, 31 Colo. App. 551, 506 P.2d 1253 (1972).

Where a party is permitted intervention, it is immaterial whether the intervention is allowed under section (a) or (b) of this rule. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959).

This distinction is important only where a motion to intervene is denied, in which case it becomes important to determine whether a party seeking intervention is in fact a necessary party. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959).

If he is not a necessary party, his only recourse upon suing out his appeal is to assert that the trial court abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959).

An order for intervention does no more than add a new party plaintiff. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959).

An order for intervention is not final, and no appeal from it lies. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959).

Intervenor, however, cannot be substituted for defendant. While an intervenor may join either plaintiff or defendant in the principal action, or may oppose both, he cannot, without the consent of plaintiff, be substituted in the place or stead of defendant. North Poudre Irrigation Co. v. Hinderlider, 112 Colo. 467, 150 P.2d 304 (1944).

Intervenor is bound by forfeiture judgment where indemnity agreement. Under a contract by which intervenors agreed to indemnify a surety company against loss, they unquestionably would be bound by a judgment of forfeiture. Allison v. People, 132 Colo. 156, 286 P.2d 1102 (1955).

Where intervention is permitted by the trial court, its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Tekai Corp. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 39 Colo. App. 528, 571 P.2d 321 (1977).

No abuse of discretion when motion for intervention denied because it was filed four days before trial. Supporting factual affidavit was not submitted and plaintiff had little opportunity to investigate the allegations. Andrikopoulos v. Minnelusa Co., 911 P.2d 663 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 929 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1996).

The determination of the timeliness of a motion to intervene is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must weigh the lapse of time in light of all the circumstances of the case, including whether the applicant was in a position to seek intervention at an earlier stage in the case. Law Offices of Quiat v. Ellithorpe, 917 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1995).

Generally, intervention by a new party is not permitted at the appellate stage of litigation. Cerveny v. City of Wheat Ridge, 888 P.2d 339 (Colo. App. 1994).

The adequacy of an applicant's representation may bar the right to intervene. Benham v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 685 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1984).

The intervention standards of this rule have no application to a criminal case, and, therefore, department of corrections may not intervene in such a case. People v. Ham, 734 P.2d 623 (Colo. 1987).

This rule had no application in a proceeding under the children's code, as the code itself expressly contemplates the active participation of interested parties. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

Rule as basis for jurisdiction. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Anderson, 34 Colo. App. 37, 525 P.2d 478 (1974), aff'd, 188 Colo. 337, 534 P.2d 1201 (1975); In re Crabtree, 37 Colo. App. 149, 546 P.2d 505 (1975).

Applied in Smith v. County of El Paso, 42 Colo. App. 316, 593 P.2d 979 (1979); O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Hous. Sys., 197 Colo. 530, 595 P.2d 679 (1979); Sec. State Bank v. Weingardt, 42 Colo. App. 219, 597 P.2d 1045 (1979); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980); In re East Nat'l Bank, 517 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Colo. 1981); Thorne v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 638 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981); Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981); People of Dept. of Soc. Serv. In Interest of A.E.V., 782 P.2d 858 (Colo. App. 1989).

II. INTERVENTION OF RIGHT.

Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 66 (1963). For article, "Civil Procedure", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with intervention of right, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 434 (1988).

An order denying intervention is appealable if intervention is a matter of right. Grijalva v. Elkins, 132 Colo. 315, 287 P.2d 970 (1955).

Standard of review. A de novo standard of review should apply when reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right under the substantive requirements of section (a)(2) because such requirements concern questions of law. Feigin v. Alexa Group, Ltd., 19 P.3d 23 (Colo. 2001).

Standard of review is de novo when considering whether the applicant has an interest related to the subject of the litigation, whether that interest may be impaired or impeded if intervention is not allowed, and whether the present parties adequately represent that interest. Feigin v. Sec. Am., Inc., 992 P.2d 675 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 19 P.3d 23 (Colo. 2001); Mauro ex rel. Mauro v. State Farm Mut., 2013 COA 117, 410 P.3d 495.

It is the duty of courts to respect the integrity of the issues raised by the pleadings between the original parties and to prevent the injection of new issues by intervention. Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 473 P.2d 725 (1970).

Intervention under section (a)(2) of this rule must...