Rough China seas ahead.

• Author: Logan, Justin
• Position: The World Today - Essay

WITH REGARDS to the U.S.'s foreign policy in the Far East, the biggest challenge would be forcing American allies to take a larger share of the defensive burden without conveying to China that Washington has grown indifferent to the future of Asia One way to finesse this would be if Washington made clear to China that, while Washington is not encouraging South Korean or Japanese nuclear proliferation, a more distant U.S. coupled with Chinese provocations toward Taiwan or other neighbors conceivably could produce such proliferation, an outcome that China strongly wants to avoid.

Relatedly, Washington should undertake a review of its basing arrangements in the region. In particular, it should put the bases in South Korea at the top of the list for potential closure. It also should use the endless protests from various Japanese political factions as justification for beginning to remove the Marines stationed in Japan.

There are three main objections to the approach described above. One says that, while U.S. allies in the region would try to balance Chinese power themselves, they simply could not keep up; the growth in Chinese economic and military power is too much for them to match. Another argument is that if the U.S. were to create distance between itself and its allies, they would not balance against Chinese power, but instead would "bandwagon" with China. The third contention admits that Asian countries can--and would--balance against Chinese power, but that in doing so they would create dangerous arms races that threaten to result in war.

These objections are dealt with below, showing that Asian countries could place significant obstacles in the way of Chinese hegemony in the region, that they likely would do so, and that the risk of war under that scenario is not grave.

Some scholars argue that America's Asian allies are too weak to balance against China effectively. For instance, John J. Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, claims that even a balancing coalition including Japan, Russia, India, South Korea, and Vietnam would be unable to contain Chinese military power. Since military might ultimately rests on economic power and demographics, dealing with this argument involves examining the economic, demographic, and military realities in Asia.

While accurately predicting economic output is notoriously difficult, basic assumptions about future economic trends are required to formulate policy. Economic forecasts for Asia vary wildly, but there is general agreement that Asia---and particularly China and India--will continue to grow in economic clout in the coming decades.

Them are estimates indicating that, although China is likely to make up approximately 23% of the world's gross domestic product in 2030, the other countries in Asia will constitute 22% of world GDP, with the U.S. comprising 17%. This should allow a significant amount of burden shifting, given the geography of Asia and China's own demographic, economic, and domestic political problems.

Economic growth in the countries of Asia merely will provide the foundations on which these nations can build national power, but economic growth is determined by gains in productivity (which are extraordinarily difficult to predict) as well as demographics (much easier to predict). In order for states to use that growth to play a larger role in international security, they are likely to develop more powerful militaries.

Demographics play an important role in international politics in two main ways. First, countries need significant numbers of young people to serve in militaries. Old men do not win wars. Secondly, the shape of the age distribution affects how much money is available for military spending. If, for instance, a country overwhelmingly is young and productive, that means the state have an easier time paying the nation's pensioners, as well as offering large numbers of young people to fight the nation's wars.

Today, most developed countries have seen advances in medical technology combine with shifting cultural mores to produce increased life expectancy and fewer babies--the productive workers of tomorrow. This combination of aging and lower birth rates has posed important problems for fiscal programs instituted under earlier, different demographic distributions. Additionally, military-aged men are shrinking as a proportion of overall population in several countries in Asia, which bears on those states' ability to generate military power without enervating their economies. Countries have dealt with these difficulties in different ways. Some have attempted to provide financial incentives for families to have children, while others have allowed for increased immigration to import workers in order to prop up welfare states.

Individual nations in Asia face different demographic challenges. Russia, for example, confronts remarkably low life expectancy, a net decrease in population, and a generally bleak demographic picture overall. As political economist Nicholas Eberstadt points out, Russia's population has...