Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse

• Published date: 01 September 2013
• Date: 01 September 2013
• Author: David C. W. Parker,Matthew Dull
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912912459566
• Subject Matter: Articles

459566PRQXXX10.1177/106591291245956
6Political Research QuarterlyParker and Dull
Regular Article
Political Research Quarterly
66(3) 630 –644
Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
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The Politics of House Committee
DOI: 10.1177/1065912912459566
prq.sagepub.com
Investigations, 1947 to 2004
David C. W. Parker1 and Matthew Dull2
Abstract
Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to
oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees,
partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated
executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees
characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified
government dampen Congress’ investigatory vigor. The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce
good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.
Keywords
oversight, Congress, president, divided government, committees
Introduction
government, or constitutional design, contingent over-
sight theory shows how party majorities, committee
Committee hearings have been instruments of congres-
structures, and statutory discretion are far more important
sional power from the early decades of American govern-
in determining when and for how long Congress turns its
ment, but the pursuit of effective and efficient government
“watchful eye” on the executive branch.
is only one incentive for Congress and its members to
Sustained periods of divided party rule coupled with
oversee the executive branch.1 The House Committee on
intensifying partisan and institutional conflict have raised
Un-American Activities hearings investigating commu-
the possibility that extra-legislative activities such as
nist infiltration in the late 1940s are attributed variously
oversight have become venues for political combat (e.g.,
to legitimate concerns about Soviet espionage, partisan-
Ginsberg and Shefter 2002). David R. Mayhew’s (1991)
inspired Republican attacks on a Democratic administra-
empirical challenge to this perspective inspired scholar-
tion, and the political ambitions of committee members.
ship refining how political scientists think about the inter-
Sixty years later, Government Oversight and Reform
play between partisan conflict and institutional politics.2
Committee Chairman Henry Waxman’s (D-CA) hearings
Subsequent research examining the consequences of
scrutinizing the use of military contractors were attrib-
divided government shows congressional investigations
uted at once to the public interest, partisanship, and per-
correlate with partisan institutional conflict, contingent on
sonal ambition (Weisman 2007). We explain the decision
factors such as party strength, variations between House
to launch and sustain congressional investigations with a
and Senate rules, and shifting institutional arrangements
contingent model of oversight politics, by which we
(Kriner and Schwartz 2008; Parker and Dull 2009). We
mean that the exercise of congressional oversight varies
extend this research by demonstrating that partisan institu-
jointly with institutional-, committee-, and individual-
tional conflict is not only correlated with investigations
level dynamics. We study the frequency and duration of
“fire alarm” style committee investigations of alleged
1Montana State University, Bozeman, USA
executive branch misdeeds between 1947 and 2004,
2Virginia Tech University, Alexandria, USA
organizing the analysis around three sets of dynamics:
institutions, committees, and reputations. Contrary to
Corresponding Author:
David C. W. Parker, Department of Political Science, Montana State
theories positing that congressional oversight is mostly a
University, 2-143 Wilson Hall, Bozeman, MT 59717, USA.
function of member incentives, the pursuit of efficient
Email: dparker@montana.edu

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Parker and Dull
631
over time, from one congressional or presidential term to
(see Bendor 1988). A significant innovation in the con-
another, but also with particular types of committees. We
gressional dominance literature is the modeling of ex ante
reveal how partisan “cartel” style committees are espe-
controls on agency discretion, particularly administrative
cially sensitive to the presence of divided government in
procedures. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989,
the decision to investigate the executive branch for accu-
1999) argue that Congress and its members face difficulty
sations of wrongdoing.
and expense in asserting ex post control through oversight
Congressional oversight is also contingent on committee-
hearings, passing new legislation, or reducing agency
and member-level dynamics in the context of delegated
appropriations. Instead, enacting coalitions write into ini-
bureaucratic discretion. Contemporary scholarship on con-
tial legislation procedures requiring the agency to seek
gressional oversight organizes efforts to explain these
public comment on proposed rules, consult with specified
dynamics around two distinct purposes. The first purpose
interests, or report information regarding the development
is publicity. Committee hearings create particularly promi-
of rules prior to implementation. McCubbins, Noll, and
nent venues for performance and position-taking, which
Weingast (1999) argue that Congress uses such procedures
shapes individual and partisan brands. The second pur-
to hardwire the preference of the enacting coalition,
pose is monitoring. Oversight is an ex post instrument of
“stacking the deck” to enhance the influence of favored
bureaucratic control, an institutional response to asym-
interests and increasing congressional and judicial influ-
metric information between principals and agents ence over policy implementation. Congress conserves
(which is a problem inherent in all formal delegations of
scarce oversight resources and, by formulizing procedural
authority; Miller 2005). These two purposes, by-products
rules and setting the groundwork for judicial intervention,
of American constitutional design, exist in tension.
administrative procedures increase the costs of bureau-
Although Woodrow Wilson (1885, 303) writes that “the
cratic drift. One common critique of the “deck stacking”
informing function of Congress should be preferred even to
thesis is the assumption of a single, unitary principal
its legislative function,” publicity from that monitoring
(Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; J. Q. Wilson 1989).
can create a considerable threat to state building. The poli-
Suggesting the work of positive theorists over the next
cies and capacity created by legislating provide oversight
decade, Morris Ogul (1976) observed “latent” congressio-
opportunities where the goal can be improving the admin-
nal influence in venues where Congress had been critiqued
istrative state or contesting state expansion and explora-
for its lack of activity. Reformulating Ogul’s “latent” over-
tion of its retrenchment. In either case, the publicity
sight, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) set out the now-
generated has consequences for party, committee, and
classic distinction between “fire alarm” and “police patrol”
individual reputations that may encourage or not aggres-
oversight. Police patrol oversight takes the form of Congress
sive monitoring of agency compliance.
walking an agency beat, sampling agency procedures and
We find that Congress has not abdicated oversight, but
actions “with the aim of detecting and remedying any viola-
its motivations for oversight are not driven by a desire to
tions of agency goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging
produce efficient and effective governance alone. such violations” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166). By
Congressional oversight in the form of fire-alarm-style
contrast, fire-alarm oversight is intermittent and reactive.
investigations serves a variety of purposes, including the
“Instead of sniffing for fires,” McCubbins and Schwartz
creation of better public policy, the advancement partisan
explain, “Congress places fire-alarm boxes on street cor-
and member agendas, the protection of the legislature’s
ners, builds neighborhood fire houses, and sometimes dis-
constitutional prerogatives, and the contestation of the
patches its own hook-and-ladder in response to an alarm”
administrative state’s capacity and direction. As the “good
(1984, 166). They argue that members of Congress prefer
government” rationale is but one motivation for initiating
fire-alarm oversight because the opportunity costs of police
and continuing investigations of executive branch malfea-
patrol are high, police patrols can miss violations, and fire
sance, we evaluate the broader implications of our find-
alarms efficiently place the costs of patrols on others when
ings by considering the recent lament with congressional
the time of members is scarce. Congress does not abdicate
abdication of oversight responsibilities.
its ex post managerial responsibilities when instituting ex
ante controls on agencies legislatively; rather, Congress
Congressional Oversight
only seems to ignore oversight because it prefers to respond
to fire alarms...