Right To An Impartial Judge

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

II. Right to an impartial judge

The Sixth Amendment right to fair trial guarantees an impartial judge. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). "It is well settled in Maryland that fundamental to a defendant's right to a fair trial is an impartial and disinterested judge." Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 105 (1993).

If the judge is biased or commits judicial misconduct, or if a neutral person would believe that the judge may be biased, and defendant learns of this prior to trial, the defendant should make a motion for recusal. See ALI-ABA Proceedings Between Arraignment & Trial at 179.

If the issue is not discovered until after trial has commenced, the defendant should make a motion for recusal and/or a motion for a mistrial. If the motion for recusal and/or the motion for a mistrial are denied, or the issue is not discovered until after the close of the trial in a case in which the defendant is found guilty, the defendant should make a 10-day motion for a new trial. If the motion for new trial is denied, the defendant should raise the issue on appeal.

If the issue is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant should file a 90-day motion for a new trial and/or a one-year motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. If the issue is not discovered until after one year after sentencing, the defendant should file a petition for a writ of actual innocence and/or a petition for post-conviction relief.

A. Appearance that the judge may not be impartial

The right to fair trial includes the right to a judge that is impartial and disinterested and the right to a judge that appears impartial and disinterested. Jefferson-El, 330 Md. at 105-06; Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 74-75 (1990). This requirement extends through sentencing, Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 200 (2001), and through a violation of probation hearing. Smith v. State, 64 Md. App. 625, 633-34 (1985). There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

In Abdul-Maleek v. State, 426 Md. 59 (2012), the Court of Appeals remanded the defendant's case for resentencing because the trial court made an explicit reference to the defendant's exercise of his right to a de novo appeal. The Court concluded that the reference "could 'lead a reasonable person to infer that [the court] might have been motivated' by an impermissible consideration." Id. at 74. In such a circumstance, the appellate court is "bound to resolve any doubt" in the defendant's favor. Id. (citing Jackson, 364 Md. at 207). In Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 207 (2001), the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing where the sentencing judge's comments about the defendant's place of residence were improper considerations that could cause a reasonable person to question the sentencing judge's impartiality.

B. Monetary interest in the outcome

The right to an impartial judge is violated if the judge has a direct, personal, and/or pecuniary interest in the conclusion or result of the case. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1972); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1928). In Tumey, 273 U.S. 510, the judge was not impartial when the judge was also the mayor, and the mayor received the costs and fees. The Supreme Court stated:

[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a Defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.

Id. at 523.

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 884-86 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the failure of an appellate judge to recuse himself from hearing a case in which the petitioner made a $3 million campaign contribution to the judge prior to hearing the case violated the Due Process Clause.

C. Personal feelings of the judge

A judge must act in an impartial and courteous manner because any opinion stated by the judge may significantly impact the jury's verdict. Johnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 386 (1999); Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 670 (1948). However, unless there is showing that the judge's words and/or actions influenced the jury adversely, the defendant is not denied a fair trial. Merely by conducting the trial in impatient manner, the judge does not deny the defendant a fair trial. Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 584-85 (1955).

In Johnson, 352 Md. at 393-94, and in Suggs v. State, 87 Md. App. 250, 257 (1991), there was a denial of a fair trial when the judge's comments impugned the integrity of defense counsel in the jury's presence. In Betz v. State, 99 Md. App. 60 (1994), the Court of Special Appeals stated:

Many judges have experienced aggravating—sometimes even defiant—conduct on the part of lawyers and others (just as many lawyers, and others, have experienced aggravating

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