Rideau v. Whitley: Lack of Evidence or Lack of Understanding?

• Author: Vanessa L. Waguespack
• Pages: 157-173

Page 157

The author wishes to thank Professor Joseph T. Bockrath, R. Gordon Kean Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, for his invaluable research assistance in preparing this article. The author is also grateful to Carl J. Serrat, III for his insightful comments on this article and for his constant encouragement and support throughout her law school career.

Introduction

Often referred to as the "Great Writ," the writ of habeas corpus, is the exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his or her conviction and seeks release. The prisoner files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a United States District Court. The petition alleges not guilt or innocence but only that the prisoner is held in violation of his or her constitutional rights. In response, the warden asserts the prisoner is lawfully detained on the basis of a criminal conviction. At that point the district court is in the position to review the petitioner's claim and determine whether his or her detention is in violation of federal law. As a way of taming the Great Writ, Congress enacted Rule 9(a). Emphasizing the significant interplay between the writ of habeas corpus and Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases,¹ the Fifth Circuit declared: "because Rule 9(a) authorizes the summary disposition of habeas corpus petitions on grounds unrelated to the constitutional claims, its application necessarily must be limited to avoid the abrogation of the very purpose of the writ."²

In 1976, Congress enacted Rule 9(a) to minimize abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by limiting the petitioner's right to assert stale claims. Under Rule 9(a) a petition attacking the judgment of a state court may be dismissed on grounds of delay if the State has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition. The equitable nature of the rule allows for petition at any time if the prisoner can prove the petition is based on grounds of which he or she could not have had knowledge in the ordinary exercise of diligence under the law.

In Rideau v. Whitley,³ petitioner Wilbert Rideau, claimed the selection of the Louisiana grand jury that indicted him for murder made him the victim of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge James Dennis, held: (1) the State failed to make a sufficient showing of prejudice in its ability to respond to the petition caused by the petitioner's delay, pursuant to Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases of Title 28; and (2) the petitioner established a prima facie case of equal protection Page 158 violation resulting from a racially discriminatory grand jury selection, which the State failed to rebut.⁴

Although several issues were addressed in Rideau, this note discusses the part of the court's holding regarding dismissal of habeas corpus claims when the State alleges prejudice in its ability to respond. The holding of Rideau was correct; the State did not meet its burden of proving particularized prejudice as a result of Rideau's delayed petition. While endorsing the court's decision, this note provides guidance for practitioners and clarifies the Fifth Circuit's standard for a particularized showing of prejudice. The standard is not unattainable; it is however, easily misunderstood. In Rideau the State failed to meet its burden of proof, perhaps not for lack of evidence, but because the State misapplied the standard of particularized prejudice required by the court.

This note is organized into four parts. Part I discusses background information, legislative history and public policies relating to Rule 9(a). Part II summarizes the Rideau case, including pertinent procedural history. Part III provides the holding and reasoning of the court; it is subdivided into three sections, each addressing the separate elements of the State's burden of proof. Finally, Part IV analyzes how the State in Rideau could successfully have met its burden of proof pursuant to Rule 9(a).

I Background

Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases was enacted by Congress in 1976. Codifying the equitable doctrine of laches,⁵ Rule 9(a) requires the courts to conduct an inquiry into the reasonableness of the petitioner's delay, and whether such delay results in prejudice to the State's ability to respond.⁶ Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides:

A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred. Page 159 Rule 9(a) was enacted by Congress to discourage the filing of stale claims.⁷ It permits the courts to quickly dismiss delayed petitions without resorting to a full consideration of the merits of the claims.⁸According to the Fifth Circuit, "it constitutes a legislative attempt to balance conflicting public policies, the right of the petitioner not to be unconstitutionally detained and the right of the State to dispute the petitioner's claim."⁹

As originally proposed,¹⁰ Rule 9(a) would have created a rebuttable presumption of prejudice in favor of the State if the petitioner filed his or her claim more than five years after the judgment of conviction.¹¹ Ultimately, Congress rejected this approach.¹² In deleting the rebuttable presumption language, the House Judiciary Committee reasoned it was unsound policy to require the defendant to overcome a presumption of prejudice.¹³

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As finally adopted, Rule 9(a) places the burden on the state to: (1) make a particularized showing of prejudice, (2) show that the prejudice was caused by the petitioner having filed a late petition, and

(3) show that the petitioner has not acted with reasonable diligence as a matter of law.¹⁴ The showing of particularized prejudice must be based on the specific challenge raised in the petition; the mere passage of time alone is never sufficient to constitute prejudice.¹⁵ Further, whether the State will be able to re-convict the petitioner is irrelevant.¹⁶ If the State makes its showing of the three elements, the burden then shifts to the petitioner to show either (1) the State actually is not prejudiced, or (2) the petitioner's delay is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the State occurred.¹⁷

II The Rideau Case

Rideau's original indictment arose out of a February 16, 1961 robbery of the Southgate Branch of the Gulf National Bank in Lake Charles. During the robbery Julia Ferguson, a bank employee, was killed.¹⁸ A Calcasieu Parish jury found Rideau guilty and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the conviction and sentence were affirmed.¹⁹

The United States Supreme Court granted Rideau certiorari and reversed his conviction and sentence.²⁰ Subsequently, venue was changed to the Nineteenth Judicial District in East Baton Rouge Parish, where the defendant was re-tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence; the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.²¹

Next, Rideau applied to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for habeas corpus relief, where the Page 161 defendant again was retried, convicted and sentenced to death.²²From that decision Rideau appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, again arguing many bills of exception. Included was Bill of Exceptions No. 2 which was reserved when the trial court overruled both defense counsel's motion to quash the general venire list, grand jury venire, and the indictment of the grand jury of Calcasieu Parish and his motion to quash the general venire list and petit jury venire of East Baton Rouge Parish.²³ The court rejected all of Rideau's bills as being without merit and affirmed his conviction.

Twenty-one years later, on July 27, 1994, Rideau filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief alleging that his indictment and conviction were unlawfully obtained by an unconstitutionally impaneled grand jury.²⁴ The State moved for dismissal of Rideau's petition as untimely under Rule 9(a) of the rules governing habeas corpus procedure. A federal magistrate judge recommended the district court deny the State's dismissal motion and grant Rideau's petition for habeas corpus.²⁵ The warden, John Whitley, filed written objections on October 17, 1997.²⁶ Following an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court denied Rideau's petition and granted the State's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(a).²⁷ Rideau appealed. The instant case is a result of that final appeal.

III Court Opinion

When a habeas claim is based on either an in-court proceeding or one which was otherwise recorded, the State must demonstrate both that the transcript is unavailable and the participants (judge, court reporter, prosecutor, attorneys, law enforcement officials, and the like) are unavailable or unable to remember critical events.^{28 29}Generally, the court will conduct a hearing...