Richard T. Green. Alexander Hamilton's Public Administration (Tuscaloosa: Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2019). 272pp, $49.95 (Cloth) ISBN 978‐0‐8173‐2016‐4

• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Author: Galia Cohen,Michael W. Spicer
• Date: 01 March 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13371

Book Reviews 351

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 81, Iss. 2, pp. 351–354. © 2021 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13371.

Reviewed by: Michael W. Spicer

Cleveland State University

Richard T. Green. Alexander Hamilton’s Public Administration

(Tuscaloosa: Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2019).

272pp, $49.95 (Cloth) ISBN 978-0-8173-2016-4

Richard Green is a scholar in what has come

to be termed the Constitutional School

of Public Administration (Newbold and

Rosenbloom2017), a school of thought that

examines the relationships between American

constitutional ideas and practices and American

public administration. His new book on the ideas and

practices of Alexander Hamilton is certainly timely

given recent widespread popular interest in Hamilton.

However, it is also an important and original book

that has the potential to contribute significantly to the

way in which public administrators, as well as those

who teach them, think and talk about the relationship

between public administration and the Constitution.

Drawing on a rich combination of history and

political theory, the book’s basic argument is that, in

contrast to more Madisonian interpretations of the

Constitution that tend to emphasize political conflict

and the role that the Constitution plays in mediating

it, Hamilton’s ideas and practices emphasize much

more the synergistic role that the Constitution can

play in encouraging principled cooperation among

the different branches and parts of government in

the service, not just of liberty, but also of important,

substantive, national political and economic ends.

This is an argument that merits special attention in

our field nowadays given current doubts about the

adequacy of our liberal democratic institutions and

siren calls for strong man leadership not just here in

the United States but around the world.

Green’s argument advances three crucial ideas here;

firstly, the idea that the constitutional separation of

powers between the different branches of government

allows and encourages significant cooperation between

them under the leadership of a strong executive

branch; secondly, that appointed public administrators

should be allowed to exercise substantial discretion

in the lawful execution of public policies; and finally,

that the Federal government should play a significant

role in advancing the economic and political power

and welfare of the nation, as well as shaping its moral

character. It is helpful, in properly understanding

Green’s argument, to examine each of these ideas in

turn. Following this, this review will examine Green’s

account of the influence of Hamilton’s ideas and

practices and of the contestation that seems to persist

over time regarding the meaning of these ideas and

practices.

Cooperation in the Separation of Powers

As Green sees it, Hamilton emphasized the capacity

of the Constitution, “through its blending” of powers

of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches

of government, “to produce an amazing degree of

cooperation among them” (4–5). Green observes here

how, in Hamilton’s view, whereas these blended or

“shared powers make very real the threat of open and

effective political conflict … more often than not,”

they “induce cooperation and permit specialization

and integration of their powers” (45). Consistent

with this idea, according to Green, Hamilton

envisaged “close, direct working relationships”

among the different branches of government rather

than open conflict (46). For instance, he favored

“cooperation between the executive and the Senate”

in order “to bolster counsel, consistency, and system

in administration” (48). Furthermore, Hamilton

intended that the “judiciary cooperate with the

executive in matters of law and policy” and that it

actually “participate in the review of all proposed

laws” (50). Also, while Hamilton saw “the House of

Representatives as the body most fit for deliberation

and investigative oversight of the administration,”

even here he expected that “more often than not,

even the House would cooperate and lend tone to the

administration” (50–51).

In other words, as Green puts it, “Hamilton

envisioned a rich variety of ties between the

administration and members of Congress, as well

as with the courts, that would knit them into an

administration marked more by harmony than by

conflict” (58). However, whereas Hamilton envisaged

a partnership among the different branches of

Michael W. Spicer is Professor Emeritus

of Public Administration and Urban Affairs

in the Levin College of Urban Affairs at

Cleveland State University. His publications

include

In Defense of Politics in Public

Administration

(University of Alabama Press,

2010),

Public Administration and the State

(University of Alabama Press, 2001), and

The Founders, the Constitution, and Public

Administration

(Georgetown University

Press, 1995).

Email: m.spicer@csuohio.edu