Revisiting the Right to a Speedy Trial: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment with The Speedy Trial Act

• Author: Eliot T. Tracz
• Position: Law Clerk to the Honorary Kathy Wallace, Minesota Third Judicial District. J.D., DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Coe College
• Pages: 2-27

REVISITING THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL: RECONCILING

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WITH THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

ELIOT T. TRACZ*

I. INTRODUCTION

Prosecutors enjoy broad discretion to initiate and conduct criminal

prosecutions; something the courts recognize in part out of respect for the

doctrine of separation of powers,

1

and in part because “the decision to

prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”

2

This holds true in

both state and federal courts.

3

This broad discretion includes the decision

to investigate,

4

permit a plea-bargain,

5

determine whether to bring

Copyright © 2019, Eliot T. Tracz.

* Law Clerk to the Honorary Kathy Wallace, Minesota Third Judicial Distri ct. J.D.,

DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Coe College. The author thanks Kellie Tracz for

her advice and the staff of the Capital University Law Review for their hard work. All

mistakes are the author’s own.

1

See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996) (separation of powers

concerns and systemic costs of judicial intrusions caution against setting threshold showing

for discovery for selective prosecution claims too low); United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d

65, 70 (1st Cir. 1998) (determination of whether to prosecute is “within broad li mits, a

prerogative of the Executive Branch”); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir.

1982) (constitutional authority for faithful execution of laws textually committed t o

executive branch).

2

Wayte v. United Stat es, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). See also Town of Newton v.

Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (broad discretion appropriate because prosecutor, not

courts, must evaluate the strength of the case, allocation of resources, and enforcement

priorities); United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1444 (7th Cir. 1986) (broad discretion t o

delay prosecution in order to allow wider investigation; such priority setting ill-suited to

judicial review).

3

See Information Exchange Network for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and

Extradition, ORG. OF AM. STS. (2007), https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/usa/en_usa-int-

desc-guide.html [https://perma.cc/674P-RBYV] (discussing how the states have broad

authority to prosecute crimes within their boundaries, but only federal government has such

authority throughout the United States).

4

See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1986) (court review of

investigation is limited by prosecutorial discretion).

5

See United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir. 1995) (no constitutional

violation when prosecutor predicated plea offer on assistance to police); Russel v. Collins,

998 F.2d 1287, 1294 (5th Cir. 1993) (no constitutional violation when prosecutor enters into

plea bargains with some defendants but not others, absent showing of impermissible

standard).

2 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [47:1

charges,

6

what charges to bring,

7

where to bring charges,

8

and when to

bring charges.

9

All prosecutions are, of course, subject to certain restrictions. A

number of those can be found within the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

10

Within this Amendment includes the right to a

speedy and public trial,

11

the right to an impartial jury of the state and

district where the crime is committed,

12

the right to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation,

13

the right to confront opposition

witnesses,

14

the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor,

15

and the right to the assistance of counsel.

16

Additional

Constitutional criminal rights may be found in the Fourth, Fifth, and

Eighth Amendments.

17

Taken together, these amendments lay a basic foundation for the

criminal law of the United States at both the state and federal levels. They

exist, in the words of Professor Amar, to deal with “the agency problem—

the danger that government officials might attempt to rule in their own

self-interest at the expense of their constituents’ sentiments and liberty.”

18

6

See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (prosecutor needs no leave of

court to seek a grand jury indictment); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1118 (2d Cir. 1990)

(neither grand jury nor judge can compel prosecutor to act when she decides not to bring

charges).

7

See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (prosecution proper

under any statute violated by defendant, without regard to penalty, as long as prosecution is

not discriminatory); Hunter v. United States, 73 F.3d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)

(when two criminal statutes apply to same conduct, prosecutor may decide under which to

proceed).

8

See United States v. Melendez, 60 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 1995) (decision to drop state

prosecution and re-indict accomplices in federal court, thus enabling prosecution of

defendant, did not violat e due process when no showing decisi on based on suspect

characteristics of defendant or otherwise in bad faith); United States v. Satterwhite, 980

F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992) (decision to pros ecute in federal rather than state court is not

evidence of abuse of prosecutorial discretion even when allegedly made without any

objective or reviewable guidelines).

9

See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795–96 (1977) (eighteen month delay

between crime and indictment is not a due process violation, even if delay prejudiced

defendant, when delay was a result of prosecutor’s good faith investigation).

10

See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

11

U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2.

12

Id. at cl. 3.

13

Id. at cl. 5.

14

Id. at cl. 6.

15

Id. at cl. 7.

16

Id. at cl. 8.

17

See generally U.S. CONST. amend IV, V & VIII.

18

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 82 (1998).