Revisiting the Right to a Speedy Trial: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment with The Speedy Trial Act

• Author: Eliot T. Tracz
• Position: Law Clerk to the Honorary Kathy Wallace, Minesota Third Judicial District. J.D., DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Coe College
• Pages: 2-27

REVISITING THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL: RECONCILING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WITH THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT ELIOT T. TRACZ * I. I NTRODUCTION Prosecutors enjoy broad discretion to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions; something the courts recognize in part out of respect for the doctrine of separation of powers, 1 and in part because “the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” 2 This holds true in both state and federal courts. 3 This broad discretion includes the decision to investigate, 4 permit a plea-bargain, 5 determine whether to bring Copyright © 2019, Eliot T. Tracz. * Law Clerk to the Honorary Kathy Wallace, Minesota Third Judicial District. J.D., DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Coe College. The author thanks Kellie Tracz for her advice and the staff of the Capital University Law Review for their hard work. All mistakes are the author’s own. 1 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996) (separation of powers concerns and systemic costs of judicial intrusions caution against setting threshold showing for discovery for selective prosecution claims too low); United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 1998) (determination of whether to prosecute is “within broad limits, a prerogative of the Executive Branch”); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1982) (constitutional authority for faithful execution of laws textually committed to executive branch). 2 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). See also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (broad discretion appropriate because prosecutor, not courts, must evaluate the strength of the case, allocation of resources, and enforcement priorities); United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1444 (7th Cir. 1986) (broad discretion to delay prosecution in order to allow wider investigation; such priority setting ill-suited to judicial review). 3 See Information Exchange Network for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition , ORG. OF AM. STS. (2007), https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/usa/en_usa-intdesc-guide.html [https://perma.cc/674P-RBYV] (discussing how the states have broad authority to prosecute crimes within their boundaries, but only federal government has such authority throughout the United States). 4 See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1986) (court review of investigation is limited by prosecutorial discretion). 5 See United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir. 1995) (no constitutional violation when prosecutor predicated plea offer on assistance to police); Russel v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1294 (5th Cir. 1993) (no constitutional violation when prosecutor enters into plea bargains with some defendants but not others, absent showing of impermissible standard). 2 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [47:1 charges, 6 what charges to bring, 7 where to bring charges, 8 and when to bring charges. 9 All prosecutions are, of course, subject to certain restrictions. A number of those can be found within the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 10 Within this Amendment includes the right to a speedy and public trial, 11 the right to an impartial jury of the state and district where the crime is committed, 12 the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 13 the right to confront opposition witnesses, 14 the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 15 and the right to the assistance of counsel. 16 Additional Constitutional criminal rights may be found in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. 17 Taken together, these amendments lay a basic foundation for the criminal law of the United States at both the state and federal levels. They exist, in the words of Professor Amar, to deal with “the agency problem— the danger that government officials might attempt to rule in their own self-interest at the expense of their constituents’ sentiments and liberty.” 18 6 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (prosecutor needs no leave of court to seek a grand jury indictment); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1118 (2d Cir. 1990) (neither grand jury nor judge can compel prosecutor to act when she decides not to bring charges). 7 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (prosecution proper under any statute violated by defendant, without regard to penalty, as long as prosecution is not discriminatory); Hunter v. United States, 73 F.3d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (when two criminal statutes apply to same conduct, prosecutor may decide under which to proceed). 8 See United States v. Melendez, 60 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 1995) (decision to drop state prosecution and re-indict accomplices in federal court, thus enabling prosecution of defendant, did not violate due process when no showing decision based on suspect characteristics of defendant or otherwise in bad faith); United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992) (decision to prosecute in federal rather than state court is not evidence of abuse of prosecutorial discretion even when allegedly made without any objective or reviewable guidelines). 9 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795–96 (1977) (eighteen month delay between crime and indictment is not a due process violation, even if delay prejudiced defendant, when delay was a result of prosecutor’s good faith investigation). 10 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 11 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2. 12 Id. at cl. 3. 13 Id. at cl. 5. 14 Id. at cl. 6. 15 Id. at cl. 7. 16 Id. at cl. 8. 17 See generally U.S. CONST. amend IV, V & VIII. 18 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 82 (1998). 2019] REVISITING THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 3 These amendments contain crucial rights and have given rise to celebrated cases, 19 yet some of these rights remain less celebrated than others. Among the most important of these rights is the right to a speedy and public trial. Courts assume that criminal prosecutions are undertaken in good faith unless evidence is presented to the contrary. 20 There would be little reason to assume that delays caused by the State were made in bad faith, yet the burden to bring criminal charges rests entirely on the shoulders of the State. For this reason, this article only considers those delays to a speedy trial that are caused or requested by the State. Section II of this article reviews the history of the right to a speedy trial found within the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 21 In doing so, this article delves into old English law and tradition in order to shed light on how the right to a speedy trial became entrenched in the American legal system. Additionally, this Section discusses the factors considered in determining whether or not this right had been violated. In Section III, this article considers the requirement for a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act. 22 This includes looking at the statute itself, as well as the case law applying the statute to specific cases. Section IV considers the similarities between the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Speedy Trial Act, as well as the differences. In Section V, this article considers how various courts have considered required showings of good faith in cases alleging that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. Finally, Section VI suggests a burden shifting mechanism once the fact of a prosecution-caused delay has been established. II. T HE S IXTH A MENDMENT R IGHT TO A S PEEDY T RIAL A. The Right to a Speedy Trial The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution proudly states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 19 See, e.g. , Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (counsel must be provided to indigent defendants in all felony cases); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring execution of people who were under eighteen at the time their crime was committed). 20 See United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1994) (absent “a showing of intentional and purposeful discrimination,” good faith in prosecution presumed). 21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 22 Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74 (2012). 4 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [47:1 speedy and public trial . . . .” 23 This right, like all the rights found in the Sixth Amendment, is a fundamental right. 24 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that the right to a speedy trial can be enforced against the states. 25 The right to a speedy trial has a long history in English law dating back to at least the year 1215 and the signing of the Magna Carta; it contained the words “[w]e will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” 26 The learned jurist Sir Edward Coke wrote that in the late thirteenth century, justices provided with commissions of “gaol delivery” and “oyer and terminer” would “have not suffered the prisoner to be long detained, but at their next coming have given the prisoner full and speedy justice, without detaining him long in prison.” 27 With lawyers in the Colonies having studied the English system of laws, it is no surprise that the first colonial bill of rights, drafted by George Mason, would reference the right to a speedy trial: “In all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial.” 28 B. Criteria for Determining Whether a Delay Violates the Right to a Speedy Trial 1. Background Willie Barker was one of two suspects in the murder of an elderly couple in Christian County, Kentucky on July 20, 1958. 29 Barker and the other suspect, Silas Manning, were indicted on September 15, 1958, and Barker’s trial was set for October 21, 1958. 30 The Commonwealth, believing that it had a stronger case against Manning (and convincing that Manning would need to be convicted before holding a conviction against...